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GLASS CEILINGS AND DEAD ENDS:
PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES, GENDER
STEREOTYPES, AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN
LAWYERS AT LARGE LAW FIRMS
Eli Wald*
INTRODUCTION

Large law firms are experiencing a shift in professional ideology.'
Competitive meritocracy, an ideology that rose to prominence in the 1960s
and 1970s and has come to dominate large law firm thinking since the
1980s, is in decline and is gradually being replaced by a hypercompetitive
professional ideology. The consequences of this ideological transformation
are significant. At stake is not only the elite status of the large firm atop the
legal profession but also the battle for equality within large law firms and in
the legal profession. Competitive meritocracy, with its emphasis on
objective standards of excellence, helped combat discrimination and open
the doors of the elite large law firms to Jewish and Catholic lawyers in the
1960s and 1970s, and to women lawyers in the 1970s and 1980s. 2 Its
decline and the rise of the rivaling hypercompetitive ideology is likely to
compromise the prospects of contemporary minorities seeking entry into
large law firms and to frustrate the ongoing quest of previously excluded
minorities for equality within these institutions.
With the help of competitive meritocracy, first generation women
lawyers in the 1970s and 1980s opened the doors of large law firms,
overcoming systematic exclusion, and explicit discrimination, by getting
hired and subsequently by being promoted to partnership.
Second
generation women lawyers in the 1990s and 2000s, entering the profession
and the ranks of large law firms in much higher numbers than their
* Charles W. Delaney Jr. Associate Professor of Law and Hughes-Ruud Research Professor,
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I thank Richard Abel, Anthony Alfieri, Arthur
Best, Elizabeth Chambliss, Marc Galanter, Bruce Green, Steve Landsman, Carol Needham,
Paul Paton, Milton Regan, Nancy Reichman, Tanina Rostain, Carole Silver, Ashley Wald,
and David Wilkins for their helpful comments. A special thank you to Cynthia Fuchs
Epstein, Deborah Rhode, and Joyce Sterling for their advice and insights, and to Diane
Burkhardt, Faculty Services Liaison at the Westminster Law Library at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law, for her outstanding research assistance.
1. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 1229 (1995) (exploring the notion of ideological paradigm shifts).
2. Infra Part III.
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predecessors, failed, however, to achieve gender equality. Regularly
constituting half the entry class of associates at large law firms, women
lawyers have run into the glass ceiling effect, failing to achieve equal
representation on the partnership ranks.3 The vast literature on the subject
identifies four factors explaining the glass ceiling effect: persistent gender
stereotypes; discriminatory and biased mentoring processes and support
networks; conservative workplace structures that are inhospitable to work4
life concerns; and implicit, yet ingrained, instances of sexual harassment.
This article identifies and explores a fifth explanatory factor-the impact
and consequences of large law firms' professional ideology.
Male-oriented professional ideology is commonly understood as a reason
for women lawyers' difficulties in advancement and achievement of gender
equality. This article expands on this insight to develop two important
ideas: it explores the notion of firmwide professional ideology, in contrast
to the traditional understanding of professional ideology at the individual
lawyer level, and it studies the various professional ideologies employed by
and dominating large law firms. In particular, while the literature tends to
attribute to large law firms a fairly abstract version of "elite" and
"meritocratic" ideology, this article develops a detailed understanding of
large law firm ideology, identifying the various ideologies battling for
supremacy:
WASP "meritocracy," competitive meritocracy, and
5
hypercompetitive meritocracy.
This article studies the ideological transformation experienced by large
law firms and explores its consequences for women lawyers employed by
them. In particular, it looks at the role professional ideology continues to
play in sustaining the glass ceiling and turning the road to gender equality
into a dead end. It explains why cautious expectations that women lawyers
will gradually do better at large law firms in terms of promotion to
partnership have not materialized and asserts that the powerful interaction
between the dominant ideology of hypercompetitiveness and persistent
gender stereotypes renders gender equality even less likely in the
6
foreseeable future.
The underrepresentation of women lawyers among the partnership ranks
of large law firms is a difficult problem to overcome on no less than four
different levels. To begin with, there is no consensus that a problem exists.
Many lawyers believe that this is a "no-problem" problem, 7 that is, as the
3. Infra Part I.
4. Id.
5. Because WASP ideology combines innovative formal commitment to meritocracy
with systematic antimeritocratic ethnoreligious discrimination, it is referred to throughout
the article as WASP "meritocracy." Infra Part Ii. See generally Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall
of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1803, 1806-25 (2008) (contrasting the
meritocratic, areligious identity of the large law firm with its hidden religious and cultural
discriminatory identity).
6. Infra Part V.
7. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA:
WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (2001) [hereinafter THE UNFINISHED AGENDA];
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percentage of women lawyers within the legal profession increases, their

percentage as partners at large law firms will rise. 8 Pursuant to this line of
thinking, the "no problem" is self-correcting at least in the sense that greater
equality for women lawyers at large law firms is just a matter of time. This
belief is widespread, notwithstanding robust empirical studies confirming
that women lawyers at large law firms (and at other prestigious segments of
the legal profession) experience the glass
ceiling effect and that significant
9
equality gains are not made over time.
The disconnect between practitioners and policymakers who subscribe to
the "no-problem" problem perspective and scholars of the legal profession
who argue that the glass ceiling effect is real, serious, and not a selfcorrecting problem is compounded by a common perception that the
underrepresentation of women lawyers is a "women-issue," even a
"feminist" concern. 10 This misleading perception expands the disconnect,

by causing some lawyers and scholars alike who are not interested in
"feminist" issues to shy away from engaging the problem. Of course, the
question of who is qualified and entitled to speak on behalf of others, let
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and ProfessionalRoles, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 39, 64-69 (1994)
[hereinafter Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles]; Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of
Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 587-94 (1996) [hereinafter Rhode, Myths of
Meritocracy]; Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and
Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991) [hereinafter Rhode, The "No-Problem"
Problem]; see also THE DIFFERENCE "DIFFERENCE" MAKES: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP
(Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2003); Deborah L. Rhode, Keynote Address: The Difference
"Difference"Makes, 55 ME.L. REV. 15, 17-19 (2002).
8. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem, supra note 7.
9. See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's
Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1995); Cynthia Fuchs
Epstein, Women in the Legal Profession at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Assessing
Glass Ceilings and Open Doors, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 733 (2001) [hereinafter Epstein,
Assessing Glass Ceilings and Open Doors]; S. Elizabeth Foster, The Glass Ceiling in the
Legal Profession: Why Do Law Firms Still Have So Few Female Partners?,42 UCLA L.
REV. 1631 (1995); Judith S. Kaye & Anne C. Reddy, The Progress of Women Lawyers at
Big Firms: Steadied or Simply Studied?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941 (2008); Judith S. Kaye,
Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM
L. REV. 111 (1988); Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring:
Deconstructingand Reconstructing Workplace Opportunitiesfor Women Lawyers, 29 CAP.
U. L. REV. 923 (2002) [hereinafter Reichman & Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring]; Nancy
J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in
Legal Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27 (2004) [hereinafter Reichman & Sterling, Sticky
Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in Legal Careers]; Steve French, Note, Of
Problems, Pitfalls and Possibilities: A Comprehensive Look at Female Attorneys and Law
Firm Partnership, 21 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 189 (2000); Nancer H. Ballard, Equal
Engagement: Observations on CareerSuccess and Meaning in the Lives of Women Lawyers
(Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 292, 1998); see also CYNTHIA FUCHS
EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (2d ed., Univ. of Ill. Press 1993) (1981) [hereinafter EPSTEIN,
WOMEN IN LAW]; MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES (1993).
See generally VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1999).
10. See Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, supra note 7. See generally Leslie
Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57 FoRDHAM L. REV. 941 (1989);
Audrey Wolfson Latourette, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Historical and
ContemporaryPerspectives, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 859 (2005).

2248

FORDHAMLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 78

alone on behalf of historically discriminated-against minorities, is not
unique to women lawyers.'I
Yet, the perception of the glass ceiling
problem at large law firms as a "women-issue" marginalizes its significance
2
and diminishes participation in the discourse about how to resolve it.'
Next, the actual problem of the underrepresentation of women lawyers as
partners at large law firms is a complex issue with few and admittedly
limited solutions.
Equality advocates have acknowledged the
ineffectiveness of regulatory measures with regard to promotion practices at
large law firms, 13 and have observed the limited development of part-time
and parental leave policies, as well as the reluctance of women lawyers to
take advantage of these policies when they are available. 14
Finally, looming over the entire discourse is a conceptual metaproblem.
Talking about "women lawyers at large law firms" triggers at least two
proper conceptual objections: to the complex term "women" and to the
complex term "large law firm." With regard to the former, it is clear that
collapsing the experiences of women lawyers into one category, ignoring
racial, sexual-orientation, ethnoreligious, socioeconomic, and cultural
distinctions, is highly problematic. Assuming that Caucasian women
lawyers (and men) face the same challenges as Black or Hispanic women
lawyers (or that Black and Hispanic women lawyers face similar
challenges) is no doubt misleading.' 5 In the same way, collapsing the
experiences of heterosexual and gay women lawyers, of married and
unmarried women lawyers, and of women lawyers with children with those
of childless women lawyers is deceptive. With regard to the latter, treating
all large law firms alike, without accounting for differences in firms' size,
organization, structure, culture, etc. is, to say the least, problematic.
The conceptual metaproblem is counterintuitive because it appears
obvious that the growing sophistication and sensitivity of the discourse that
demands unpacking concepts such as "women" lawyers and "large law
firms" is unqualifiedly desirable. Such demands, however, might at times
cause the discourse to stall by rejecting necessary general propositions as
11. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the FirstAmendment: Should a Black

Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030 (1995).
12. A recent example involves the New York State Bar Association's revision of a
previously scheduled all-male panel on "Women in Law" and the debate it generated. See
Joel Stashenko, State Bar Revises Panel Lineup of 'Gentlemen 'for Women 's Event, N.Y.

L.J., Jan. 21, 2010, at 1.
13. See, e.g., Nancy L. Farrer, Of Ivory Columns and Glass Ceilings: The Impact of the
Supreme Court of the United States on the Practice of Women Attorneys in Law Firms, 28

ST. MARY'S L.J. 529 (1997). Courts have routinely deferred to law firms with regard to
promotion decisions. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Ezold v.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 512-13 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that "[t]he
district court... impermissibly substituted its own subjective judgment for that of Wolf in
determining that Ezold met the firm's partnership standards").
14. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 329-79.
15. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas-Genderedin Justice /
Gendered Injustice: Latinas, Fronterasand the Law, I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 353 (1998);
Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: SituationalRacism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1013 (2004).
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overinclusive and too abstract.
Professional ideologies and gender
stereotypes indeed impact diverse women lawyers and different types of
large law firms differently, yet at some level it should not be overlooked or
trivialized that they affect all women lawyers and all large law firms.
Bearing these substantive, methodological, and conceptual challenges in
mind, this article is organized as follows. Part I explains the realities and
thinking behind the glass ceiling status quo. Summarizing the extensive
empirical and theoretical literature on the subject, it documents the
experience of first generation women lawyers at large law firms in the
1970s and 1980s and the reasons for the glass ceiling effect experienced by
second generation women lawyers in the 1990s and 2000s. Part II offers a
brief account of recent practice reality changes experienced by large law
firms, with an emphasis on the ongoing consequences of the economic
downturn, changes that inform the experiences of women lawyers at large
firms, as well as the perception of consequences of gender stereotypes and
the formation of professional ideologies.
Part III develops the idea of large law firms' professional ideology in two
ways. First, it draws a distinction between the commonly understood
notion of professional ideology that operates mainly at the level of
individual lawyers, and professional ideologies that guide and shape the
practices of firms and, in particular, large law firms. Second, while the
existing literature tends to abstractly and sketchily attribute to large law
firms an "elite" and "meritocratic" ideology, Part III explores in detail the
nature of large firms' professional ideology and identifies several ideologies
competing for supremacy in this sphere.
Part IV studies the notion of gender stereotypes and their impact on
women lawyers working at large law firms. As is the case with the notion
of professional ideology, vast literature exists on the subject. Part IV offers
a brief summary of the literature and proposes a fresh typology of gender
stereotypes: "better stay at home" (type 1), "incompetent" (type 2), and
"disloyal and undercommitted" (type 3). This suggested typology is used to
demonstrate that, while some gender stereotypes have been mostly
discredited and have only minor negative consequences (namely, type 1
stereotypes), other stereotypes continue to constitute significant hurdles for
gender equality at large law firms (namely, type 2 stereotypes), while still
others experience a resurgence and have particularly negative consequences
under the prevailing hypercompetitive ideology (namely, type 3
stereotypes).
Exploring the meeting of professional ideology and stereotypes in large
law firms, Part V advances the main claim of this article, that the new
powerful professional ideology of hypercompetitive meritocracy
dominating elite large law firms clashes with the still-powerful type 3
gender stereotypes and is likely to further challenge the prospects of gender
equality at large law firms. Finally, Part VI suggests that because
hypercompetitive meritocracy is an unstable professional ideology, large
law firms might soon experience yet another shift in professional ideology,
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one that might be more hospitable toward the advancement of women
lawyers toward equality.
I. WOMEN LAWYERS, LARGE LAW FIRMS, AND THE
GLASS CEILING EFFECT

Fifty years ago, the U.S. legal profession still consisted of, nearly
exclusively, men lawyers. 16
Historically, nineteenth century courts
throughout the country refused to admit women into the practice of law. 17
Many law schools refused to admit women law students, and some
continued to impose admissions gender quotas as late as the 1960s and
early 1970s. 18 Women lawyers began entering the profession in substantial
numbers in the 1970s, and the percentage of women lawyers has since been
steadily increasing. 19 By the early 1980s women lawyers constituted
approximately eight percent of the practicing Bar; 20 by 1991 this number
had increased to approximately twenty percent, and in 2000 it reached
twenty-seven percent. 2 1 With women law students accounting for

16. Women lawyers comprised only three percent of the legal profession as late as the
late 1960s. See Ballard, supra note 9, at 1.
17. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(opining that women's nature precludes them from membership in the professions and suits
them to "the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood"); In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875) (finding women's "tender
susceptibility" inconsistent with the qualities required by the practice of law). The U.S.
Supreme Court later validated the sentiments expressed by such state court opinions by
holding that states have the power to determine whether women are competent to practice
law. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 118 (1894). See generally Barbara Allen Babcock,
ClaraShortridge Foltz: "First Woman," 30 ARIz. L. REV. 673, 698 n.134 (1988); Kathleen
E. Lazarou, "FetteredPortias": Obstacles Facing Nineteenth-Century Women Lawyers,
WOMEN LAW. J., Winter 1978, at 21, 22.
18. Ballard, supra note 9, at 2; Beatrice Dinerman, Sex Discrimination in the Legal
Profession, 55 A.B.A. J. 951, 951 (1969) (noting that women admitted to law schools are
more closely scrutinized than men for "ability and motivation" in the admissions process);
Donna Fossum, Women in the Legal Profession: A ProgressReport, 67 A.B.A. J. 578, 579
(1981) (reporting that women law students continue to comprise only a fraction of law
school classes). See generally RONALD CHESTER, UNEQUAL ACCESS: WOMEN LAWYERS IN A

CHANGING AMERICA 87-116 (1985); KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE
WOMAN LAWYER INAMERICA 1638 TO THE PRESENT 57-61 (1986).
19. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 313-14. "In 1970, eight percent of all law students
were women." Ballard, supra note 9, at 2.
20. ABA, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2009), available at http://new.abanet.org/
marketresearch/PublicDocuments/LawyerDemographics.pdf. By 1989, women made up
almost fifty percent of most law school graduating classes. Elizabeth K. Ziewacz, Can the
Glass Ceiling Be Shattered?: The Decline of Women Partnersin Large Law Firms, 57 OHIO
ST. L.J. 971,973 (1996).
21. ABA, supra note 20; CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE
U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN2000, at 3 (2004).
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approximately fifty percent of the national law school student body, 22
23
women will soon account for half of the profession.
Yet while the sheer numbers of women lawyers may suggest gender
equality within the profession, the reality is far different. Numerous studies
confirm that women lawyers are concentrated in low-status practice areas of
the profession and underrepresented in high-status practice areas;2 4 are
underrepresented within the elite of these respective practice areas, even in
the areas in which women lawyers constitute a majority of practitioners;
and are paid less than their male counterparts for comparable positions and
25
work.
26
Large law firms, for over a century an integral part of the legal elite,
feature a particular problem of gender inequality: while women lawyers
account for approximately fifty percent of entry-level hires, they fail to
advance to the coveted equity partner position, accounting for
27
approximately only fifteen percent of large law firm partners nationwide.
22. Paula A. Patton, Women Lawyers, Their Status, Influence, andRetention in the Legal
Profession, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173, 173 (2005).
23. For an excellent recent review of both recent changes and the literature on women
lawyers, see Fiona Kay & Elizabeth Gorman, Women in the Legal Profession, 2008 ANN.
REV. L. & Soc. Sci. 299.
24. Martha Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield: Contemporary Dilemmas
Facing Women Law Professors, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195 (2005); Deborah J.
Merritt, Are Women Stuck on the Academic Ladder?, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 241 (2000);
Robert L. Nelson, The FuturesofAmerican Lawyers: A Demographic Profile ofa Changing
Profession in a Changing Society, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345 (1994); Patton, supra note
22, at 173 (stating that "[w]omen [lawyers] comprise about one-half of the ABA-accredited
law school graduating class but account for [less than seventeen percent] of the partners in
law firms nationwide," and the disparity in women partners is even more striking given that
almost seventy-one percent of women lawyers work in private practice law firms).
25. AM. BAR ASS'N, THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKING POINT:
A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE EMERGING CRISIS IN THE QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LIVESITS IMPACT ON LAW FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES 6 (1991) ("[W]omen in most positions
continue to be worse off financially than their male colleagues."); NANCY REICHMAN &
JOYCE S. STERLING, GENDER PENALTIES REVISITED (2004) (documenting gender inequities in
compensation); Ronit Dinovitzer, Nancy Reichman & Joyce Sterling, The Differential
Valuation of Women's Work: A New Look at the Gender Gap in Lawyers' Incomes, 88 Soc.
FORCES 819 (2009); Joni Hersch, The New LaborMarket for Lawyers: Will Female Lawyers
Still Earn Less?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (2003).
26. See, e.g., JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRACTICE: A STUDY OF LAWYERS'
LIVES 73 (1995) (observing that "[b]ecoming a partner in a law firm is often the most
important event in the [lawyer's professional life]"); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH
POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 231 (1988) (arguing that
law firms are the embodiment of power in the legal system); ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL
STREET LAWYER 7 (1964) (observing that practices of large law firms gradually become
practices of law itself); JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST
POWERFUL LAW FIRMS 15-17 (1983) (noting that elite firms carry tradition and permanence
of law); Wald, supra note 5, at 1806 n.7; see also EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 9, at
176 (asserting that large law firms essentially "make" law).
27. In 1992, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein found that while women attomeys have constituted
40-50% of entering associate classes, they account for only 37% of associates and
approximately 11% of partners. Epstein et al., supra note 9, at 29 1; Ballard, supra note 9, at
2; see also ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT
THE NUMBERS 25 (1995) (reporting that, in 1991, women lawyers made up only 10% of all
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The extensive literature on the subject aptly describes the experiences of
women lawyers at large law firms in terms of opening doors and
subsequently running into a glass ceiling.2 8 While first generation women
lawyers in the 1970s and 1980s have achieved access to the profession
generally and, in particular, opened previously closed doors at large law
firms by being hired as associates and by eventually being promoted to
partnership, 29 second generation women lawyers in the 1990s and 2000s
have disappointedly experienced the glass ceiling effect, consistently failing
30
to achieve equal representation at the partnership level.
The glass ceiling effect is counterintuitive. Early scholars speculated,
and many lawyers continue to believe today,3 1 that the underrepresentation
of women lawyers among large law firm partners was going to gradually
32
decline, as more female associates got hired and subsequently promoted.
Moreover, not only is the glass ceiling effect counterintuitive, it also
contradicts the conventional economic wisdom that discrimination is
inefficient and would not persist over time. 33 According to this line of
law firms' partners nationwide). In 2007, women accounted for 16% of equity partners,
26% of nonequity partners, and 30% of "of counsel" lawyers. NAT'L ASS'N OF WOMEN

4
(2007), available at http://www.nawl.org/Assets/Documents/2007+Survey+Report.pdf.
NALP reports that women represented 17.9% of all partners in 2006. NALP, Percentage of
Women and Minorities at Law Firms Up Slightly for 2006-Minority Women Lag Behind in
Partnership Ranks (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.nalp.org/2006octpercentageofwomen
andminorities. Judge Judith Kaye, noting that the "male-to-female [partner] ratios.., leveled
off and have remained relatively stagnant since 1992," called this the "'50/15/15'
conundrum." Kaye & Reddy, supra note 9, at 1946. Judge Kaye explained that "[f]or more
than fifteen years, half of law school graduates have been women, yet only approximately
fifteen percent of law firm equity partners and chief legal officers have been women." Id. at
1946 n.13. The fifteen-year mark is significant, clarified Judge Kaye (writing in 2008 and
quoting 2007 numbers), "as 1992 [was] the first year that J.D. enrollment by gender reached
[fifty percent]." Id. See generally Kay & Gorman, supra note 23.
28. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 26, at 134 (describing the increasing proportion of
women as "[t]he most striking change in the social composition of major law firms and the
legal profession as a whole").
30. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 9, at 200-05; Foster, supra note 9, at 1636;
French, supra note 9, at 189-90; Kaye & Reddy, supra note 9, at 1944-53. The vast glass
ceiling literature focuses on the experience of women lawyers at large law firms, and to
some extent also explores the phenomenon in legal academia and the judiciary. Supra note 7.
While large law firms, the academia, and the judiciary are all elements of the legal elite, the
reasons for the glass ceiling effect in them appear to be quite different and, surprisingly,
underexplored. This article's insights regarding the powerful interplay of professional
ideology and stereotypes as an explanation of the glass ceiling effect in large law firms may
also be used to shed some light about the experience of women lawyers in academia and the
judiciary. For example, the glass ceiling effect experienced by women law professors is
somewhat surprising given law schools' liberal orientation and flexible work conditions.
The interplay between gender stereotypes and the prevailing professional ideology, however,
helps explain the glass ceiling effect.
31. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem, supra note 7.
32. Rhode, Gender and ProfessionalRoles, supra note 7; Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy,
supra note 7; Rhode, The "No-Problem"Problem, supra note 7.
33. See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
LAWYERS, NATIONAL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS

DISCRIMINATION LAWS 390-91 (1992).

Gary S. Becker coined the term "economics of

2010]

GLASS CEILINGS AND DEAD ENDS

2253

reasoning, systematically failing to promote female associates who are as
qualified as male associates to partnership would exact too high a cost on
discriminating law firms in an increasingly competitive market for large
law firm human capital. 34 Failing to promote qualified women associates
will put discriminating law firms at a competitive disadvantage, as
nondiscriminating law firms will have a larger and more talented pool of
partners. Indeed, hiring, training, but failing to promote qualified women
associates who then are laterally hired and promoted by nondiscriminating
firms will amount to subsidizing the competition's human capital.
Especially if large law firms embody "greedy institutions," 35 with a
growing emphasis on the financial bottom line, surely they will not at the
same time persist with inefficient hiring and promotion policies. Firms will
therefore routinely promote women associates to partnerships and, over
time, the underrepresentation of women partners problem will correct itself,
because as the associate entry-level classes consist of fifty percent women
lawyers, upon promotion women will eventually gain equal representation
has fittingly characterized this perspective as
as partners. Deborah Rhode
36
the "no-problem" problem.
Because the glass ceiling effect is counterintuitive and it contradicts basic
economic reasoning, many lawyers and nonlawyers alike continue to
believe in the "no problem" problem perspective, notwithstanding the fact
that the glass ceiling effect has been robustly documented. 37 To be clear,
"no problem" proponents do not question the empirical findings proving the
glass ceiling effect. Rather, they rely on three interrelated arguments to
question the existence and seriousness of the problem. First, they argue that
not enough time has passed to allow for greater equality and that the
"problem" will eventually, over time, correct itself.
Because this perspective is so prevalent, it is worth noting that given the
unique hiring and promotion policies of large law firms, even if the "no
problem" argument did hold for women lawyers working at large law firms,
gender equality within the partnership ranks would take a very, very long
time to accomplish. A simple example will illustrate the point. Suppose
Law Firm has 100 male partners and no female partners. 38 Suppose further
that Law Firm hires every year forty first-year associates, that it eight years
later promotes four associates to partnerships, and that one partner retires

discrimination" in GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971),
exploring the economic rationale for and consequences of discrimination.
34. See, e.g., French, supra note 9, at 214-16.
35. Cynthia Fuchs Epstein has applied Lewis Coser's term to large law firms. Epstein et
al., supra note 9, at 383-85; see also Epstein, Assessing Glass Ceilings and Open Doors,
supra note 9, at 751.
36. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem, supra note 7,at 1736.
37. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
38. This is a realistic assumption for a typical large law firm as late as the 1970s. See
Wald, supra note 5, at 1806 n.7.
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every year. 39 Assume that Law Firm begins to hire women associates at the
same rate as male associates and promotes them equally. That is, every
year Law Firm promotes two male and two female associates to
partnership. Finally, assume that the retiring partner is always a male
partner. 40 In this simplified example, it will take Law Firm one hundred
years to achieve equality within its partnership ranks! 4 1 In other words,
even pursuant to the "no problem" problem logic, gender equality might be
considered a problem because
of the extremely long time it would take the
"market" to overcome it. 42
Second, "no problem" proponents assert that the underrepresentation of
women lawyers at the partnership levels does not constitute a problem
because it is explained by women's own choices to opt out of the
partnership track. 43 Finally, some "no problem" advocates concede the
problem in theory, but consistently fail to acknowledge it in particular
44
instances.
Nonetheless, even pursuant to the "no-problem" perspective, given that
women lawyers regularly constitute half of the entry-level associate hires at
large law firms, one would expect the percentage of women partners to
consistently, if only slowly, rise. 45 It has not. 46 In what scholars have
dubbed the glass ceiling effect, the percentage of women partners among
large law firms has initially risen but then plateaued at approximately
39. This is a simplified assumption as large law firms' growth has not been linear but
rather exponential. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 87-98 (1991).

40. Initially, this assumption seems logical given that Law Firm has only male partners.
Over time, as women lawyers are promoted to partnership, the assumption becomes
increasingly strained. Note, however, that taking account of women lawyers' retirement will
have no qualitative effect on the example; rather, it will only further delay the timeline for
achieving gender equality. Of course, the assumption also fails to take account of available
empirical evidence that establishes that women lawyers have high attrition rates relative to
their male counterparts. Once again, relaxing the retirement assumption to control for
attrition rates will not qualitatively affect the example and will only further delay the
timeline for achieving gender equality.
41. It could take even longer when one incorporates retirement of women lawyers over
time, as well as attrition rates that are not the result of retirement due to old age. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
42. Studying gender diversity on corporate boards, Deborah Rhode and Amanda Packel
similarly find that "progress-especially in the last decade-has stalled. At current rates of
change, it will take almost seventy years before women on corporate boards reach parity
with men." Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards 3 (Nov.
2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
43. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY
143-53 (1997); Deborah L. Rhode & Barbara Kellerman, Women and Leadership: The State
of Play, in WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 4-6

(Deborah L. Rhode & Barbara Kellermen eds., 2007).
44. See RHODE, supra note 43, at 5-9; Deborah L. Rhode, "What's Sex Got To Do with
It? ": Diversity in the Legal Profession, in LEGAL ETHICS: LAW STORIES 233 (Deborah L.

Rhode & David J. Luban eds., 2006).
45. In the above-mentioned example, women lawyers will account for 10% of the
partnership after six years and 25% after twenty years.
46. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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fifteen percent. 4 7 Moreover, even this limited success has partly been
explained not by an increase in the number of female 48associates promoted
to partnership from within the firm but by lateral hires.
What explains the glass ceiling effect? Two things are clear. First,
women associates depart large law firms in disproportionate numbers
compared with men lawyers, 4 9 and, second, men lawyers are more likely to
Consequently, it appears
get promoted to partnership than women lawyers.
50
that the former phenomenon explains the latter.
What, then, explains the disproportionately higher attrition rates of
women lawyers? Some scholars argue that women lawyers choose to leave
large law firms in higher numbers. 5 1 This explanation is dissatisfactory on
two grounds. To characterize the departure of women lawyers as a free
choice is to argue that women attorneys opt out, as opposed to being pushed
out. As extensive research demonstrates, however, women's career
sacrifices are explained not only by the choice of individual women lawyers
but also by choices made by employers and public decision makers. 52 More
importantly, the free-choice explanation avoids the question. Even if it
were assumed to be true, why would women lawyers opt out in
disproportionate numbers?
Scholars of the legal profession argue that the interplay of several
considerations explains the higher attrition rate of women lawyers at large
law firms and the glass ceiling effect: the impact of negative gender
stereotypes, the lack of mentorship and support networks, inhospitable

47. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
48. Epstein, Glass Ceilings and Open Doors, supra note 7, at 357.
49. Id. at 439; see also Patton, supra note 22, at 174 ("Women were much more likely
than men to be represented in... attrition statistics.").
50. To illustrate, remember that Law Firm hires forty associates every year, twenty male
associates and twenty female associates. If attrition rates were similar for men and women
lawyers, Law Firm could expect thirty-two associates, sixteen men and sixteen women, to
depart over the course of eight years (an attrition rate of 80%). This would leave the Firm
with eight associates to choose from, out of which it would select four associates for
promotion, two men and two women.
Now consider an attrition rate for women lawyers significantly higher than that of
men lawyers. After eight years, nineteen female associates have left the Firm (95% attrition
rate) and thirteen male associates have left the Firm (65% attrition rate), leaving the Firm
with eight associates to choose from, seven male associates and one female associate. The
example illustrates two points: First, even if it wanted to, the Firm could not promote two
female associates because only one female associate is eligible for promotion. Remember
that even if the Firm could promote two female associates every year, gender equality within
the partnership rank will take a century to accomplish. If the Firm only promotes one
woman associate for partnership (and three male associates) every year, gender equality will
never be attained. Second, the Firm might be hard pressed to promote its one female
associate every year. In a given year, for a variety of reasons, such as subject matter fit, two
male associates might be promoted, which will further delay advancements toward gender
equality at the Firm.
51. EPSTEIN, supra note 33, at 77.
52. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 165-67 (1989); Rhode, The "No-

Problem " Problem, supra note 7, at 1758, 1768-70.
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workplace structures, and sexual harassment. 53 First, women lawyers at
large firms are confronted with multiple stereotypical assumptions about
their poor fit: lack of assertiveness, competitiveness, and business literacy
necessary for a successful career as an attorney; incompetence; and
insufficient commitment to the firm and its clients. 54 Worse, the impact of
these "stereotypes is compounded by the subjectivity of performance
55
evaluations and.. . other biases in decision-making."
Next, women lawyers often experience difficulties in finding partner and
senior associate mentors, 56 who play an important role in advancing a
junior associate's career. Mentors provide subject-matter expertise and act
as a reference source, offer informal insight and analysis of the firm's
politics and inner workings, and, closer to promotion time, provide
necessary support and advocacy on behalf of the candidate. 5 7 Increased
intrafirm competition and a shift from the traditional "[c]lients belong[] to
the firm" perspective to the notion that clients belonged to rainmaking
partners in the 1990s and 200Os 58 made mentorship and business networks
even more important to the development of "partner" skills and
correspondingly made lack of mentorship and limited access to business
59
networks even more devastating to women lawyers.
Rigid work conditions compound the glass ceiling effect. Large law firm
structures demand excessive and inflexible hours and resist reduced or
flexible schedules. Clients, in turn, come to expect instant responsiveness

53. Of course, questions of gender inequality, the work-life balance, and the glass
ceiling effect are not unique to law practice. Leading contributions include MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK
BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1997); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2000). For an effective survey of the
literature, see Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressingin the Master's Cloths, 109 YALE L.J. 745
(2000) (reviewing WILLIAMS, supra).
54. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 7, at 14-16; Foster, supra note 9, at 1645-48;
French, supra note 9, at 203-04.
55. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 7, at 15. Partners and clients are more likely
to notice and recall information that confirms their prior stereotypical assumptions rather
than information that contradicts them. For example, "attorneys who assume that working
mothers are less committed tend to remember the times they left early, not the nights they
stayed late." Id; see also Foster, supra note 9, at 1658-71.
56. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 7, at 16; Foster, supra note 9, at 1642-43;
French, supra note 9, at 200-02.
57. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law
Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1581, 1608-13 (1998).
58. See, e.g., Patton, supra note 22, at 178. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT
WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004).
59. See infra Part V.B; see also Patton, supra note 22, at 188 (exploring reasons for why
women fail to mentor other women lawyers).
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and total availability. 60
Finally, some women lawyers
continue to
61
experience overt and subtle forms of sexual harassment.
Far from underestimating the powerful limiting force of these
considerations on women lawyers' advancement in large law firms,
scholars and advocates for gender equality writing in the 1990s and early
2000s have nonetheless cautiously suggested reasons for optimism. Gender
stereotypes, limited mentoring and networking opportunities, conservative
structures, and harassment certainly explained the slow progress made
toward gender equality. Yet, the hope was that the inefficient, wasteful, and
inequitable nature of the underrepresentation of women lawyers would
drive profit-maximizing law firms to overcome it, significant hurdles
62
notwithstanding.
Indeed, at a symbolic level, referring to the experience of secondgeneration women lawyers as the glass ceiling effect reflects a somber yet
cautiously optimistic tone. Women lawyers certainly faced a serious
obstacle on the road to equality, a ceiling preventing their advancement in
the prestigious segments of the profession, yet the hurdles were not
impossible to overcome. The ceilings were made of glass and thus
breakable. To be sure, the journey was a hazardous one, shattered glass
symbolically suggesting that anyone attempting to break through might get
hurt. Indeed, the "house" itself might be left without a ceiling; yet the
ceiling, importantly, was not made out of, for example, impenetrable
concrete. 6 3 This cautiously optimistic prediction has failed to materialize.
Worse, third-generation women lawyers entering large law firms in the
2010s might be even less likely than their predecessors to achieve gender
60. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 7, at 17; see also Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo:
The Peculiar Case of Attorneys' Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909 (2009)
(exploring the changing understanding of lawyers' role from one that balanced client service
against duties to the court, the legal system, and the public, to a client-centered role).
61. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 7, at 19-22; see also Jay Marhoefer, The
Quality of Mercy Is Strained: How the Proceduresof Sexual HarassmentLitigationAgainst
Law Firms FrustrateBoth the Substantive Law of Title VII and the Integration of an Ethic of
Care into the Legal Profession, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 817 (2003).
62. Judge Judith Kaye, an astute commentator on the progress of women lawyers at
large law firms, exemplifies this cautious optimism. Stating,
[i]t was clear in 1996, in 2006, and is equally apparent today that women's
advancement in the profession requires "conspicuous, vocal vigilance." And I
continue to believe that "the progress of women in the legal profession is not a
natural phenomenon, like erosion or accretion. It doesn't just happen. It never
will."
Kaye & Reddy, supra note 9, at 1942 (quoting Judith S. Kaye, Moving Mountains: A
Comment on the Glass Ceilings and Open Doors Report, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 573, 575
(1996); Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals, Introductory Remarks to the
N.Y. State Bar Association Committee on Women in the Law Annual Edith I. Spivack
Program: The Status and Expectations of Women in the Legal Profession (Jan. 24, 2006)).
Judge Kaye nonetheless concludes with an optimistic tone, noting "notable successes" on the
road to gender equality at large firms. Id. at 1966-73.
63. But see Reichman & Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in
Legal Careers,supra note 9, at 30 (describing the obstacles women lawyers face in terms of
a concrete, rather than glass, ceiling).
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equality. Metaphorically, women lawyers are facing not a formidable glass
ceiling but a dead end.
II. NEW PRACTICE REALITIES AT LARGE LAW FIRMS: UNPRECEDENTED
COMPETITION, INCREASED INSTABILITY, AND THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

By some measures, large law firms have been in a constant state of
turmoil over the last century, 64 experiencing an ongoing decline of
professional values and rise of commercialism; greater business
uncertainties; and increased competition for clients, for talented lawyers,
and even intrafirm competition among the partners for power, prestige, and
compensation. 65 The continuously evolving business landscape of large
'law firms is thus better understood not as an isolated episode or even a
series of events, but rather as an ongoing challenge with different practicereality manifestations.
In the 1960s and 1970s, large law firms experienced immense
exponential growth as the result of increased demand for legal services by
corporate clients who consumed new kinds of legal services, 66 significant
growth in the body and scope of statutory and administrative laws
regulating the conduct of entity clients, and the increased complexity of the
law. 67 The firms' own internal growth engine, the result of promoting
associates to partnership and seeking to maintain their effective partner-toassociate ratios, further fueled their growth. 68 Traditional practice realities
64. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before the Harvard Ethical
Society (May 4, 1905), in 39 AM. L. Rcv. 555, 559 (1905) (noting the shift in a lawyer's
general role, stating that "able lawyers have ... allowed themselves to become adjuncts of
great corporations" and urging a graduating class of law students to stand their professional
ground and practice as lawyers for the people instead of as servants of corporate interests).
65. Large law firms are not unique in appearing to experience a perpetual state of crisis.
See Deborah L. Rhode, The ProfessionalismProblem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 283, 283
(1998) ("Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline. Or so it appears from the
chronic laments by critics within and outside the bar.").
66. See Magali Sarfatti Larson, On the Nostalgic View of Lawyers' Role: Comment on
Kagan and Rosen's "On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice," 37 STAN. L.
REv. 445, 448 (1985) ("It is well known that the large law firm was born... in a period of
institutional reorganization dominated by the rise of the giant business corporation."); Milton
C. Regan, Jr., Taking Law Firms Seriously, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 155 (2002).
67. Robert L. Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transformations: Explaining the Growth of
Large Law Firms, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 733, 736-37 (book review).
68. The large firm relied on a probation period for purposes of training and selecting
talent from within its associate pool for promotion: providing its associates with incentives
to work hard, thereby responding to difficulties associated with monitoring both the inherent
quality of the associate's work (as opposed to the mere logging of long hours at the office)
and the relative quality of work, given the firm's dependence on teamwork as opposed to
individual output, and discouraging associates from leaving and grabbing the firm's human
capital assets. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 39, at 4-5. Promotion to partnership at the
end of the probation period provided associates with deferred rewards and thus appropriate
incentives to overcome the temptations of shirking, grabbing, and leaving. Finally, to
maximize utilization of both the associates' labor and the partners' human capital, the firm
set ratios of partners and senior associates to associates that enabled both effective mentoring
and supervision of the associates' work, and effective use of the partners' and senior
associates' time. See id at 89-108.

2010]

GLASS CEILINGS AND DEAD ENDS

2259

of a gentlemanly, anticompetitive legal environment began to crumble. The
"old ways," in which compensation was scarcely discussed, 69 lateral hiring
was taboo, 70 competition for clients was considered discourteous, 71 and the
"going rate"-the starting salary of associates in lieu of a marketdetermined rate-was agreed upon, 72 were all gone. Advertising and client
solicitation were no longer forbidden. 73 Following the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 74 and Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,75 deregulating the market for legal services, The American Lawyer
began regularly publishing previously taboo information about attorney
compensation, ranking the status of law firms both by the number of
76
lawyers they employed and also by their reported profits per partner.
In the 1980s and 1990s large law firms continued to experience increased
competition:

"firm breakups, lateral hirings, . . . [retention of] contract

attorneys, temporary attorneys, senior associates, staff attorneys, and other
new categories of attorneys" have all become common practice realities. 77
As large law firms continued to mushroom in numbers and grow in size
against a trend of the rise of in-house counsel and consequently curtailed
demand by corporate entities, 78 old long-term relationships between entity
69. Often, an associate did not know what to expect upon making partner. See SMIGEL,
supra note 26, at 92.
70. See PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT WALL
STREET LAW FIRMS 60-61 (1973) (noting the rarity of lateral movement by individual
lawyers and that there were no "open breaks").
71. Id. at 72 ("In the blue-chip bar client shifts are rare.").
72. SMIGEL, supra note 26, at 57-59.
73. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court, in a line of cases dealing with various states'
ethics rules, questioned the cavalier and anticompetitive apparatus instituted by the
organized bar dominated by the large law firms. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350 (1977) (holding that a ban on price advertisement violates First Amendment commercial
speech rights); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding that a fee schedule
constituted price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act). In Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, the Court explicitly rejected respondents' claim that "price advertising will bring
about enhanced commercialism" and "irreparably damage the delicate balance between the
lawyer's need to earn and his obligation selflessly to serve." 433 U.S. at 368. CompareIn re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (allowing attorney solicitation for nonprofit impact litigation),
with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding sanctions on lawyer
who sought plaintiff in a tort suit).
74. 421 U.S. 773.
75. 433 U.S. 350.
76. "[T]he Bates decision has had a profound, perhaps radical, effect on our profession."
Duncan A. MacDonald, Speculations by a Customer About the Future of Large Law Firms,
64 IND. L.J. 593, 594 n.4 (1989).
77. Fern S. Sussman, The Large Law Firm Structure-An Historic Opportunity, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 970 (1989). See generally Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The
Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867
(2008). Nelson has called these changes the transformation of the "classic big law firm" into
the "late big law firm." Nelson, supra note 67, at 737 (quoting GALANTER & PALAY, supra
note 39, at 76).
78. See Wald, supra note 5, at 1849-51. See generally MARK STEVENS, POWER OF
ATTORNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW FIRMS 7-16 (1987) (studying the rise of corporate
counsel); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm,
37 STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985); Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger:
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clients and large law firms disintegrated, "beauty-contests" for clients
became the norm, 79 and competition among large law firms reached
unprecedented levels. Still, profits per partner reached all-time highs, and
large law firms, in spite of the tremendous changes to their practice
realities, were slow to proactively react in terms of adjusting and rethinking
their organizational structures.
The late 1990s and 2000s saw increased competition intensify. The
disintegration of the traditional structure of the large firm continued with
greater force. The old promotion-to-partnership tournament has been
replaced with multiple tournaments, the "up or out" policy all but
abandoned, and lateral hiring and mergers and acquisitions of law firms
have become the norm rather than the exception. New positions and levels
80
of status such as nonequity and salaried partners were implemented,
resulting in new "elastic" or "diamond" hiring and promotion structureswith fewer entry-level associates and more contract lawyers, paralegals, and
lateral and mid-level associates hired; 81 extended partnership tracks
adopted, 82 with a higher associate-to-partner ratio; 83 and a more demanding
84
billable hour requirement imposed.
Until the economic downturn of 2008-2009 hit, however, large law firms
were relatively slow to react to changing practice realities in terms of the
The Promotion-to-PartnerTournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REv.
747, 751-52 (1990) (discussing the rise of in-house corporate law departments); Robert L.
Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of
Inside Counsel in Large Corporations,34 LAW & SOCY REv. 457 (2000); Robert Eli Rosen,
The Inside Counsel Movement, ProfessionalJudgment and OrganizationalRepresentation,
64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of
House Counsel, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 449, 458-59 (1988).
79. French, supra note 9, at 194; Patton, supra note 22, at 176 ("[L]aw firms have
evolved from a client service orientation to a client production orientation." (citing Amee
McKim, The Lawyer Track. The Case for Humanizing the Career Within a Large Law
Firm, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 167, 172-75 (1994))); see also McKim, supra; S. S. Samuelson, The
OrganizationalStructure of Law Firms: Lessons from Management Theory, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 645 (1990).
80. Patton, supra note 22, at 179-80.
81. Nicholas Varchaver first described the changing structure of large law firms as
diamond shaped in Diamonds Are This Firm's Best Friend, AM. LAW., Dec. 1995, at 67; see
also Galanter & Henderson, supra note 77 (describing the evolving structure of large law
firms as elastic).
82. Patton, supra note 22, at 180; John P. Weil & Co., The Traditional Law Partnership
Track: Does It Still Exist? Quo Vadis?, http://weilandco.com/new/article6.htm] (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010). The report notes that during the late 1980s, the partnership track moved
from four to six years, to seven to nine years. Id. The average track, of course, varies by
region and firm size.
83. See LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL 170 (1996) (noting that while historically the

ratio was close to one associate to one partner, it has consistently fallen, first to two to one,
and then even further).
84. Rhode, Gender and ProfessionalRoles, supra note 7, at 62-63. A revealing Price
Waterhouse survey found that in 1976, the average Wall Street associate billed 1667 hours.
See EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 9, at 209. By 1994, at the eight Manhattan firms
surveyed by Epstein, the hours billed ranged from 1800 to 3000. See EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN
LAW, supra note 9, at 382.
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scope of their responses. The economic meltdown changed all that, with
large law firms taking unprecedented steps of mass firing of support staff,
associates, and even partners,8 5 freezing and even marginally lowering
salaries, 86 deferring offers to first-year associates, and cancelling summer
recruitment programs. 87 At the same time they were implementing these
short-term cost cutting measures, large law firms were forced to become
more price competitive vis-d-vis their clients, lowering hourly rates,
88
capping overall costs, and limiting staffing.
The economic downturn has also prompted large law firms to rethink
their long-term organizational structure. A growing number of large law
firms have abandoned the up-or-out promotion process, introduced
additional tracks of partnerships (nonequity, salaried), and even eliminated
the de facto guarantee of life tenure partnership by firing and de-equitizing
partners. 89 With regard to associates, large firms have expanded the use of
contract attorneys and of counsel lawyers, thereby diminishing their
demand for associate work; 90 decreased investments in associate
mentorship, both in terms of programs and in terms of committing senior
associates and partners' time for the process; 9 1 extended associateship
tracks, either directly, or by abandoning the year-based training and
promotion tracks for associates and replacing it with a system that relies on
milestones, with the practical result of extending the associate track from
85. See, e.g., Law Shucks, Layoff Tracker, http://lawshucks.com/layoff-tracker/ (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010).
86. See Debra Cassens Weiss, How Low Will New Lawyer Pay Go? As Low as $110K
to $130K at Reed Smith, A.B.A. J., Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/
how low will-pay__go-new-reed smithlawyers to -make_130k to 110k; Debra Cassens
Weiss, Top 250 Law Firms Collectively Shrank by 5,259 Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Nov. 9, 2009,
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/top.250_law-firms collectively-shrank by_5259_lawy
ers.
87. See, e.g., Posting of David Lat & Elie Mystal to Above the Law, Cravath Offers
Voluntary Deferral to Class of 2009-and Delays Class of 2010 a Full Year,
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/06/cravath-voluntary-deferral.php
(Jun. 12, 2009, 11:17
EDT); Posting of Elie Mystal to Above the Law, Morgan Lewis Cancels 2010 Summer
Program, http://abovethelaw.com/2009/07/morganjlewiscancels_2010_summ.php (July 14,
2009, 14:58 EDT); Posting of Elie Mystal to Above the Law, Skadden Offers a Voluntary
Deferral Option, http://abovethelaw.com/2009/03/skadden-deferraloption.php (Mar. 12,
2009, 17:28 EDT); JD Journal, Summer 2010 Trifecta: Squire Sanders Cancels Program,
http://www.jdjournal.com/2009/07/20/summer-2010-trifecta-squire-sanders-cancelsprogram/ (July 20, 2009).
88. See, e.g., Karen Sloan, Firms' Billing Rates Inched Up During 2009, NL Survey
Shows, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 7, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=
1202436087594 (reporting cost cutting measures and a smaller than usual annual increase in
annual rates); Law Shucks, Top London Firms Cutting Rates, http://lawshucks.com/
2009/09/top-london-firms-cutting-rates/ (Sept. 21, 2009).
89. See generally Galanter & Henderson, supra note 77.
90. See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous
Boundaries: The Disaggregationof Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2137 (2010).
91. See, e.g., Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, So, You Want To Be a Lawyer? The
Questfor ProfessionalStatus in a ChangingLegal World, 78 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2289 (2010);
David B. Wilkins, Partner,Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 120 HARV.
L. REv. 1264 (2007).
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eight to ten years to an indeterminable longer track; 92 and enforced even
more demanding billable-hour requirements, subject to the availability of
93
work given the economic downturn.
Early evidence following the economic recession of 2008-2009 suggests
further transformation and turmoil as large law firms experiment with
abandoning the classic agency model of providing legal services and
partnering with their clients in joint ventures, expanding outsourcing by
disaggregating legal services and reassembling them at a lower cost, and by
gearing up for possible reform that would allow the formation of
94
multidisciplinary companies.
While it might be tempting, from a historical perspective, to write off the
most recent changes in large law firm practice realities as yet another step
down the century-long road of increased competition, doing so would
foreclose on an important insight-that the changes have not affected all
large law firm lawyers similarly. For example, some scholarly attention has
been paid to the impact of these changes on partners, the erosion of the
95
status of partnership, and the dilution in the meaning of being a partner,
such as the previously unheard of de-equitizing, firing, and forced
retirement of some partners. Yet insufficient attention has been given to
studying the impact of the changes on specific categories of attorneys
within large firms, in particular minority and women lawyers. 96 This
omission is perhaps explained in part by the fact that emerging empirical
data regarding the extent of these developments regarding partners and
associates alike do not reveal any striking patterns of inequity.
Indeed, even as the economic downturn panic settles, and more data
regarding its impact becomes available, one should not expect to find any
inequitable patterns regarding women and minority lawyers irrespective of
whether such inequities have been taking place. Large law firms, mindful
of the political implications of treating, or even being perceived as treating,
92. Anthony Lin, Road to Large Law Firm Partnerships Is Getting Longer for

Associates, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 2004, at 1; Posting of Gregory W. Bowman to Law Career
Blog, Law Firm Partnership:
What's in a Name?, http://law-career.blogspot.com/
2008/01/law-firm-partnership-whats-in-name.html (Jan. 20, 2008, 21:54 EST) (reporting
longer partnership tracks).
93. See Aric Press & John O'Connor, Lessons of the Am Law 100, AM. LAW., May 2009,
at 107; Brian Leiter's Law School Reports, http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/
2009/04/the-upheaval-in-the-market-for-new-lawyers-at-the-big-law-firms-temporary-orpermanent.html (Apr. 30, 2009, 13:57 CST).
94. See David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2067 (2010); Regan & Heenan, supra
note 90; Paul D. Paton, MultidisciplinaryPractice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193 (2010).
95. See Wilkins, supra note 91; Bowman, supra note 92.
96. But see, e.g., Posting of Elie Mystal to Above the Law, Did Gender Play a Role in
Layoffs at Squire Sanders?, http://www.abovethelaw.com/2009/07/did-gender.playa role inlayo.php (July 17, 2009, 14:28 EDT); Alana Roberts, Is Law Firm Diversity
Suffering As Recession Continues?, DAILY
Bus. REV.,
Jan. 30, 2009,
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/careercenter/lawArticleCareerCenter.jsp?id= 1 202427853263
(noting the impact of the economic downturn on large law firm diversity).
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minority lawyers inequitably, have a strong incentive not to leave behind a
paper trail of, for example, firing or failing to promote women lawyers
disproportionately. 97 Instead, large law firms, if they were to treat women
lawyers inequitably would likely encourage these lawyers to leave and later
characterize their departure as voluntary. As such, all the data will
subsequently show is what it has shown consistently since the mid 1980sthat women lawyers depart large law firms in disproportionate numbers and
experience the glass ceiling effect.
The question thus becomes whether there is reason to believe large law
firms do treat women lawyers inequitably given recent changes in their
practice realities. To see why that is likely to be the case, it is important to
note that these recent practice developments were far from inevitable. First,
extending the billable hour requirement may appear to be an intuitive
response to increased competition, but it is not at all clear that it is a
reasonable measure. Adding an hour or two to an already demanding
workday may result in reduced marginal productivity. Second, law firms
could have reduced starting and existing salaries significantly, as opposed
to firing and delaying associate promotion. Finally, the economic downturn
could have allowed large law firms to take advantage of, and invest in,
technology to facilitate part-time schedules, parental leaves, etc. In fact,
utilizing part-time schedules would seem to be an attractive vehicle for
weathering the storm of economic instability and uncertainty. While some
large firms have resorted to deferring offers and paying incoming associates
reduced salaries, use of part-time arrangements has not increased.
The range of measures adopted by large law firms in response to the
economic downturn has not been coincidental. Rather, the practice reality
changes have led to a transformation in the firms' governing professional
ideology, which in turn has shaped and guided the policies implemented by
the large firms. The increased competition has led large law firms to adopt
a more explicit "around-the-clock" service mentality.
This new
hypercompetitive work ethic has resulted in an expectation that both
associates and partners work and bill more hours and be available "24/7" to
serve the needs of their corporate clients. Law firms expect their lawyers to
adjust to this new hypercompetitive era, displaying the necessary loyalty to

97. For example, citing privacy considerations, many large law firms have recently
refused requests by NALP to provide information about their partnership structures and, in
particular, about the breakdown of equity versus nonequity partners in their ranks. See Debra
Cassens Weiss, NALP Dropped Quest for Nonequity PartnerDataAfter Law Firms Resisted,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/article/nalp-droppedquest for -nonequity-partner-data after_lawfirms resisted. One possible motivation for
refusing to provide NALP with data regarding nonequity partnership is that it might reveal
gender inequities and the placement of a disproportionate number of women partners on
nonequity tracks. See Vivia Chen, What Women Want: Law Firm PartnershipDetails, AM.
LAW., Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/LawArticlePC.jsp?id=1202444495743&
slreturn1l&hbxlogin=l (reporting that "[w]omen lawyers are furious" with the lack of
transparency regarding large law firms' nonequity tracks).
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the firm and its clients, and reprioritizing their work-life balance to reflect
98
greater loyalty to the firm.
In sum, while the trend of increased commercialization and competition
has been a long time in the making, recent changes have led to a new and
significant development-the rise of a new professional ideology. This
hypercompetitive ideology in turn impacts different categories of lawyers
within the large law firms, especially women lawyers, disproportionately.
This new ideology, and the particular ways in which law firms chose to
respond to changing practice realities have had, and continue to have, a
disproportionately negative impact on women lawyers, possibly rendering
the challenge of reaching gender equality in the equity partnership track not
a glass ceiling but a dead end.
III. LARGE LAW FIRMS' PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY

Professional ideology, and, in particular, lawyers' professional ideology,
is a surprisingly controversial concept. While the mere definition of what it
means to be a professional-formal education, esoteric intellectual
knowledge, self-regulation, monopoly over the provision of legal services,
elevated socioeconomic and cultural status, commitment to the public good,
and role-morality 99-seems
innocent enough, early attempts 10at1
professionalizing the practice of law, 10 0 as well as subsequent efforts,
have been criticized, not without some merit, as attempts by presiding elites
to exclude "undesirable" newcomers and monopolize the profession. 0 2 At
its best, professional ideology captures ideals and aspirations, thus guiding
and shaping codes of professional conduct and practice realities more
generally. Even so, any professional ideology not only shapes but also
simultaneously reflects practice realities, and as a reflection of practice
98. This phenomenon, and the workplace ideology that fuels it, are not unique to the
legal profession. Rhode and Kellerman demonstrate that "[f]or leaders in business, politics
and the professions, all work and no play is fast becoming the norm rather than the
exception; sixty-hour workweeks are typical." Rhode & Kellerman, supra note 43, at 13-15
(citing ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, supra note 53, at 70; JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER:

WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 71 (2000);

Claudia Wallis, The Casefor Staying Home, TIME, Mar. 22, 2004, at 51, 53).
99. See generally TALCOTr PARSONS, The Professionsand Social Structure, in ESSAYS

IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 36-40 (rev. ed. 1954); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1 (1975).
100. See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 7, 51-52 (Joseph Neal 2d ed.
1836); GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY: PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed. 1993).

101. For example, the American Bar Association Canons, Model Code, and current
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
102. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) (exploring regulatory measures
purportedly aimed at ensuring the quality of legal services as a means of limiting access to
the profession); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN

MODERN AMERICA 25-26 (1976) (arguing that large law firms used meritocratic standards as
a cover for discriminating against "undesirable" ethnoreligious minority lawyers); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 185-211 (1999)

(denouncing so-called "professionalism" as an anticompetitive mystique meant to ensure the
profession's monopoly over the provision of legal services).
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realities, professional ideologies are rationalizations and excuses, used to
1 03
justify and explain claims to elite professional status and power.
While, historically, lawyers have successfully claimed the practice of law
to be a profession, the classic account of what it means to be a lawyer dates
10 4
back to the early 1970s.
The traditional account is William Simon's
"standard conception," 10 5 according to which the practice of law is defined
partisanship and nonaccountability. 10 6
by two essential principles:
Partisanship calls upon lawyers to act as zealous advocates pursuing the
interests of their clients to the best of their abilities within the bounds of the
law. Nonaccountability instructs lawyers to defer to clients' exercise of
autonomy and authority over setting the goals of the representation and in
return absolves attorneys from legal, professional,
and moral accountability
07
for the objectives they help clients pursue. 1
Debates over lawyers' professional ideology tended to accept the
"standard conception" as its baseline, with proponents defending its
principles on utilitarian grounds (arguing that it embodies the most effective
method of truth finding)10 8 and on moral grounds (arguing that it protects
individual autonomy and enables "[f]irst-class citizenship"1 09), and
opponents asserting that it frustrates truth finding, justice, and fairness.' 10
103. See Eli Wald, An Unlikely Knight in Economic Armor: Law and Economics in
Defense of ProfessionalIdeals, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 1042, 1043-47 (2001).
104. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalismand Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REV. 669, 672-75 (1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers]; Wasserstrom, supra note 99, at 1 n.1. See generally Murray L.
Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND
LAWYERS' ETHICS 150 (David Luban ed., 1984).
105. William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29. While scholars commonly refer to Simon's formulation as the
"standard account," it is not at all clear that it is accepted in practice, as opposed to theory.
Ann Southworth's work suggests that lawyers in fact do identify with their clients and do not
buy into the "standard conception." ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT:
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION 68 (2008).
106. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, supra note 104, at
672-75; Simon, supra note 105, at 36-37.
107. Simon, supra note 105, at 40-41; see also Wald, supra note 60.
108. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 3234 (3d ed. 2004); Monroe H. Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
109. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities,1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617 ("Put simply, first-class citizenship
is dependent on access to the law.").
110. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 148-49, 160-74 (1988)
(arguing for a system of "'moral activism': a vision of law practice in which the lawyer who
disagrees with the morality or justice of a client's ends does not simply terminate the
relationship, but tries to influence the client for the better"); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19-64 (2007) (criticizing the principle of nonaccountability for
protecting lawyers from moral culpability for a client's conduct); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 22-30 (1988) (developing the concept of
purposive lawyering); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen
Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 639 ("Pepper appears to have blurred the crucial
distinction between the desirability of people acting autonomously and the desirability of
their autonomous act."); Simon, supra note 105, at 99-10 1.
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Critical scholars have persuasively argued that there is little sense to talk
about generic "lawyers" and generic "ideology." Accepting a one-size-fitsall ideology that treated all lawyers similarly irrespective of socioeconomic,
cultural, ethnoreligious, and gender characteristics was "bleaching out" 1 11
important aspects of what it means to be a lawyer. In particular, Deborah
Rhode has dissected the standard professional account, exposing its male
12
presumptions and traits.1
Somewhat lost in these powerful substantive critiques was the challenge
that the "standard conception" was individual based and conceived; it
assumed that the basic unit of law practice was an individual lawyer and
was developed accordingly. Of course, when Simon offered his account of
lawyering centered around an individual lawyer as. the locus of analysis, the
majority of lawyers were still solo practitioners, and many partnerships
were in effect office-sharing arrangements with independent and fairly
autonomous individual lawyers at their core. Moreover, even as law firms
were growing in numbers and in size, individual lawyers continued to play
a key role as the core professional unit, in terms of ideology and,
correspondingly, as targets of professional regulation. 113 This was, and
arguably still is, a reasonable proposition because at many small-sized firms
the key actors are very much still the firms' individual lawyers.
To date, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the
conceptualization and meaning of law firm ideology or professional
ideology at the firm level, 1 14 a surprising fact given the considerable
scholarly interest in the rise, organization, and structure of the large law
firm. 115 In a nutshell, by attributing both the organizational design and
ideological underpinning of the large law firm to Paul D. Cravath and his

111. See David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional
Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REv. 1502, 1509-50 (1998).

112. Rhode, Gender and ProfessionalRoles, supra note 7, at 44-53.
113. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, their predecessors (the Model Code

and the Canons), as well as every state code of professional conduct implementing the
Model Rules, all essentially regulate individual lawyer conduct and do not meaningfully
regulate at the law firm level. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm
Regulation Debates, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119 (2005) (examining the tension between

traditional individual lawyer regulation and law firm regulation and argbments that the latter
may undermine individual accountability); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, New Sources of
Managerial Authority in Large Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 63, 87-92 (2009)

(exploring the individual lawyer and law firm regulation debate in the context of the
institutionalization of risk management processes at large law firms).
114. To be clear, significant attention has been given to the broader notion of the firm
culture. See, e.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 39; SMIGEL, supra note 26; Susan Saab
Fortney, Soul for Sale: An EmpiricalStudy of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and
the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REv. 239 (2000); Wald, supra note
5; Peter J. Winders, Law Firm Culture-Its Importance and How To Overcome It, 2004
PROF. LAW. 11.

115. For an overview of the scholarship, see The Law Firms Working Group,
Bibliographies: Resources of the Law Firms Working Group, http://firms.law.indiana.edu/
research/index.shtml (last visited on Mar. 12, 2010).
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"Cravath System,"' 1 6 the literature assumes, mostly implicitly, that the
large law firm is a professional meritocracy and then proceeds to investigate
the decline of these meritocratic values in the face of rising commercialism
and increased competition. 117 While as a crude account, meritocracy sums
up the professional ideology of the large firm, it is not rich enough to
encompass the possibility of the existence of several different
manifestations of meritocratic ideologies, nor the possibility of ideological
transformations within large 18law firms and their impact on particular lawyer
constituencies within them.1
The simplified meritocracy account consists, in fact, of four competing
ideologies dominating large law firm thinking in different eras.
Gentlemanly premeritocracy, the leading ideology at the time large law
firms first rose in the late nineteenth century; WASP "meritocracy," the
revolutionary ideology of the large law firm during its rise to prominence
and until the 1960s; competitive meritocracy, an ideology that emerged
gradually after 1945, began to dominate large law firms in the 1960s and
1970s, and began a slow, consistent decline in the 1980s; and finally,
hypercompetitive meritocracy, an offshoot of competitive meritocracy that
began to develop in the 1980s and gradually rose to prominence by the
2000s.
The large law firm emerged in the late nineteenth century, the brainchild
of visionaries such as Paul D. Cravath and Louis Brandeis. Indeed, prior to
Cravath's era, large law firms did not exist; "a firm of four attorneys was
considered a 'large' firm." 119 The prevailing ideology in the profession,
and its small law firms, was gentlemanly, paternalistic vis-A-vis clients, laid
Admission to the practice was based on
back, and informal. 120
examinations following years of "reading the law" and apprenticeships, and

116. Paul D. Cravath is credited with being among the first to mold and implement these
organizational features together in a working law firm. See WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890-1930, at 196-200

(1986); see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 39, at 9-10; 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE
CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS: 1819-1947, at 1-4 (1946).

117. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 1 (exploring the decline of the old professional
paradigm and the rise of the business paradigm at large law firms).
118. Other aspects of the firmwide ideology that require further delineation are the
processes by which it is disseminated and internalized by firm members. See Jean E. Wallace
& Fiona M. Kay, The Professionalism of Practising Law: A Comparison Across Work
Contexts, 29 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1021 (2008) (examining dimensions of

professionalism among law firm partners and associates). Associates presumably buy into
the firms' fairly abstract ideology of meritocracy when they decide to join and subsequently
stay with the firms. How it is, however, that over time they come to accept and even
internalize specific ideologies, particularly hypercompetitiveness, as the embodiment of
excellence and meritocracy is a separate question.
119. Wald, supra note 5, at 1806 n.7; see also Eli Wald, The Rise of the Jewish Law Firm
or Is the Jewish Law Firm Generic?, 76 UMKC L. REV. 885, 887-88 (2008).

120. Wald, supra note 5.
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was based as much on nepotism and the social and professional standing of
one's mentor as it was on merit and excellence. 12'
Cravath changed all of that, introducing meritocracy as an ideological
and organizational cornerstone.
The Cravath System stressed elite
educational credentials as a hiring prerequisite (graduation from an elite law
school, top grades, and law review affiliation), training and mentorship
within the firm, promotion to those who excel (as opposed to the thenprevailing kinship and nepotism practical standards for promotion), the
development of specialization and unique professional expertise, the
development of team concepts and subsequently firmwide expertise, and
1 22
the delivery of legal services in a professional, efficient manner.
Cravath and his contemporaries revolutionized the practice of law,
introducing the large law firm as a unit of practice and displacing kinship
and nepotism with an explicit commitment to meritocracy as the ideological
backbone of law practice and the large law firm. Yet it is also important to
remember that the Cravath System's notion of meritocracy, while a radical
departure from the prevailing nepotism, was still very much limited and a
product of its time. It was a meritocracy that could not conceive of
socioeconomic, cultural, and ethnic minorities meeting its standards.
Moreover, it was a meritocracy that inherently built and relied on
Protestant values and white-shoe ethos.1 23 As a firmwide ideology, WASP
"meritocracy" entailed an expectation of intense loyalty to the firm and its
clients as a facet of a belief in the practice of law as a secular calling, a
loyalty that in turn both demanded and explained long hours in the office,
often at the expense of personal commitments.
It also carried an
expectation that firm lawyers embody and meet both standards of
professional excellence and of elite status. WASP "meritocracy" thus
entailed, on the one hand, strong academic credentials, hard work, and
increased specialization of the firm's lawyers and, on the other hand,
reflected the powerful interplay of professional, socioeconomic, and
cultural networks-and the dominance of the WASP infrastructure in the
upper spheres of the American business world.
Further, WASP
"meritocracy" manifested itself in commitment to the up-or-out promotion
policies with a quasi-cartelistic agreement avoiding cherry-picking and
lateral hires. Salaries were not explicitly discussed or negotiated, and
information about financial compensation or the firm's well-being was not
disseminated. Competition for clients was unheard of, and law firms and
corporate clients alike displayed long-term loyalty to each other. 124 Thus,
while the ideology was truly committed to aspects of professional
121. See Eli Wald, The Other Legal Profession and the Orthodox View of the Bar: The
Rise of Colorado'sElite Law Firms, 80 U. COLO. L. REv. 605, 655-67 (2009); see also Marc
Galanter & Simon Roberts, From Kinship to Magic Circle: The London Commercial Law
Firm in the 20th Century, 15 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 143 (2008).

122. Cf Wald, supra note 5, at 1819-20.
123. Id.; Wald, supra note 119, at 888-89.
124. Supra note 22.
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excellence and merit, it inherently incorporated elitist characteristics of
white-shoe culture and Protestant dogma.
As a result, WASP ideology was inhospitable to non-WASP and women
lawyers who otherwise met its meritocratic standards. In its defense, before
World War II few non-WASP and women lawyers met these meritocratic
standards, making egalitarian concerns about its nonmeritocratic aspects
mostly theoretical. The percentage of women law students was negligible,
and many elite law schools-graduation from which was a hiring
prerequisite at the elite large firms-did not admit women. Similarly, few
Catholic, Jewish, and racial minority law students were admitted to elite
law schools. As practice realities gradually changed after 1945, however,
the nonmeritocratic aspects of the WASP ideology became increasingly
apparent.
Nonetheless, before rushing to judge the Cravath System too harshly, one
ought to remember the day and age and avoid presentism. 125 To say, for
example, that the Cravath System discriminated against women lawyers
would be to superimpose a contemporary understanding of discrimination
on an era in which there were very few women lawyers. Cravath's vision,
and ideology, was not exclusionary of women; rather, it was devoid,
fittingly for its time, of their presence in the profession. Here it might be
useful to recall Karl N. Llewellyn's insightful distinction between social
and legal justice. 126 Borrowing from Llewellyn, Cravath developed a
model and advanced an ideology that was legally meritocratic within the
constraints of the social realities of his day.
WASP "meritocracy" dominated until 1945, when it gradually began to
erode and was eventually replaced with competitive meritocracy by the
1960s and 1970s. This ideological shift reflected and shaped practice
realities experienced by large law firms. As American society matured, and
was slowly overcoming ethnoreligious, racial, and gender biases, so did
large law firms. Jewish and Catholic male law students began to graduate
from elite law schools in significant numbers, as informal and formal
admissions quotas were eliminated. At the same time, an exponential
growth in corporate demand for legal services unsettled the large law firm
world. Existing firms began to grow at a rate that threatened their WASP
commitments, and new competitors emerged.
One should not, however, overstate the impact of ideological changes in
explaining complex corresponding changes in practice realities. The elite
WASP law firms of the era found it hard to adjust and adapt to the new
practice realities. In fact, their commitment to WASP "meritocracy"
constrained their ability to compete effectively with newcomer large law
125. Presentism is the attempt to explain historical phenomena from a contemporary
perspective, thus failing to appreciate considerations that were important at the time but are
not today. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.

251 (1975) (exploring the risk of presentism in analyzing nineteenth-century law).
126. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 91-92
(1930).
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firms and, in particular, with Jewish law firms. 12 7 Nonetheless, over time,
competitive meritocracy replaced WASP "meritocracy" as the dominant
ideology guiding the organization and structure of large law firms.
Just as WASP "meritocracy" entailed a significant genuine commitment
to meritocracy, so did competitive meritocracy. That is, while competitive
meritocracy reflected the increasingly competitive market conditions
experienced by the large law firm, the new ideology also exhibited a true
commitment to meritocracy. The significant difference between WASP
"meritocracy" and competitive meritocracy was abandoning the WASP
underpinnings and implicit requirements and relying to a greater extent on
measures of objective merit such as law school status, grades, class ranking,
and law review for purposes of hiring and promotion. As a result, WASP
elite law firms gradually began to hire and subsequently promote Jewish
and Catholic attorneys, and, as Jewish law firms grew, they were able to
attract, over time, non-Jewish lawyers.
By the early and middle 1970s, when women lawyers entered the legal
profession in significant numbers, competitive meritocracy had become the
dominant professional ideology at large law firms. The competitive
impulse of the new ideology included a willingness to recruit top talent,
regardless of gender, and this commitment to meritocracy meant that
women lawyers who met its objective standards of excellence were, in
theory, plausible candidates for hiring by the large law firms.
This does not mean, of course, that first-generation women lawyers did
not encounter significant hurdles as well as explicit and implicit forms of
discrimination. Certainly they did. Indeed, the competitive aspect of the
new ideology included more explicit notions of subject matter expertise and
competence that women lawyers were assumed not to possess, as well as a
commitment to working longer hours in the service of clients. While the
justification for long hours in the office was no longer based in the
Protestant ethos of a calling, but rather in a market-based service ideology,
it assumed that women lawyers would be unable to meet its demands
because of their personal commitments as wives and mothers.
Still, competitive ideology, as opposed to WASP ideology, was more
hospitable to the possibility of women lawyers meeting its criteria of
excellence. While the hiring and promotion of women lawyers was hardly
imaginable under WASP "meritocracy," it was conceivable pursuant to an
ideology that put greater emphasis on objective meritocracy. And indeed,
first-generation women lawyers overcame significant challenges and
opened the doors of large law firms for the next generation.
Importantly, this ideological shift did more than respond to and justify
changing practice realities. Over time, competitive meritocracy was
celebrated as a more enlightened and equitable ideology. Although the
ideological transformation was not necessarily motivated by egalitarian
impulse and a desire for greater equality within the elite ranks of the legal
127. See generally Wald, supra note 5; Wald, supra note 119.
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profession, it was subsequently marketed, both externally to clients and
outsiders and internally to lawyers inside and outside large firms, as an
advancement. Large law firms were claiming to be more professional,
more egalitarian, and more equal, and therefore more deserving of elite
status atop the legal profession because they had transitioned from WASP
"meritocracy" to competitive meritocracy, notwithstanding the fact that
other, less noble forces led to the ideological shift.
The gradual shift from competitive meritocracy to hypercompetitiveness,
which began in the mid-1980s, was reflective of changes in practice
realities. 12 8 Increased competition in the market for corporate legal services
drove large law firms to redefine their professional commitments. The
firms were successfully recruiting graduates of elite law schools and
promising not only high entry-level salaries and the potential for financial
prosperity upon promotion to partnership, but also elite professional status,
intellectual work (alongside the required paperwork), and interaction with
the rich and powerful in the service of an elite group of clients. The
ideology began to lose its appeal, and its promises were exposed as empty
when competitive market realities rendered them unattainable. 129 Law
firms could no longer credibly claim to provide elite training, mentorship,
intellectual work, and elite status. Instead, increasingly, all they could
promise their lawyers were longer hours and higher pay.
Yet very long hours and high pay were not sufficient to attract elite
lawyers and justify a claim to elite status. Professional ideology had to be
rewritten
to paint this grim
reality in attractive
colors.
Hypercompetitiveness did just that: it portrayed lawyers as near-heroic
servants, zealous service providers who pursue the interests of their clients
around the clock. Under this new ideology, working 24/7 was considered a
badge of honor, proof that lawyers were truly committed to client-centered
service. This hypercompetitive ideology took over, beginning in the mid1980s. The ideology became client-centered to an extent Cravath and his
contemporaries could likely not have imagined, both in terms of deference
to clients and also in terms of the belief that serving private interests serves
the public interest. The ideology turned increasingly long hours and
around-the-clock service mentality into elements proving the commitment
of lawyers to their clients, and reestablished the claim of large law firms to
128. See supra notes 64-98 and accompanying text.
129. Anthony Kronman's The Lost Lawyer constructs a parallel tale of how changes in
large law firms' practice realities rendered their intellectual and public-calling appeal
unattainable. Kronman asserts that increased competition and specialization deprive lawyers
of the ability to develop and practice practical wisdom, which is a calamity not only for the
legal profession but for our society as a whole. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993). While Kronman's conception
of the ideal lawyer-statesman and his or her longing for lost professional glories has been
duly challenged, see, e.g., Peter Margulies, ProgressiveLawyering and Lost Traditions, 73
TEX. L. REv. 1139 (1995) (reviewing MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993) and

KRONMAN, supra), his account compellingly details how changing practice realities can
render prevailing professional ideologies unattainable. KRoNMAN, supra.
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elite status, ironically because it defined elite status and excellence in terms
of the absolute loyalty and commitment its clients demanded.
That is, pursuant to the new hypercompetitive ideology, the around-theclock commitment was not merely a response to market realities of
increased competition. It was the embodiment of value, proof that lawyers
provide an invaluable product and service. Of course, if the target audience
of the ideology was mainly the client, mere proven commitment to work
24/7 would likely not have sufficed as proof of providing value. Clients,
after all, would not likely take longer hours, for which they had to foot the
bill, as proof of quality and elite performance and would have required
actual proof of value creation. 130 Hypercompetitiveness, however, mainly
targets lawyers, not clients, attempting to self-convince large-firm lawyers
that they are engaged in elite practice and, as importantly, to convince
lawyers outside of the large-firm sphere that large law firms deserve their
elite status atop the profession.
Accordingly, large law firms had no incentive to try to choose avenues
that would reduce the longer billable hours of associates and partners.
Doing so would demonstrate that lawyers' services were dispensable and
that the work was not deserving of elite status. This is why large law firms
chose the path of longer hours and refused to accommodate part-time
schedules, work-from-home solutions, and other changes that would have
been reasonable responses to practice pressures they experienced and, as of
late, to the economic downturn. Doing so would have compromised the
claim of large law firms to elite status. The longer billable hours required
and the around-the-clock service mentality, which were reasonable yet
certainly not inevitable functions of increasingly competitive practice
realities, were thus recast as the manifestations of a noble new ideology,
elevated to a not only required, but celebrated status.
While hypercompetitive, the new emerging ideology continued to
embody a true commitment to meritocracy. Even as their growing size
forced large law firms to dig deeper into elite law schools' classes and
eventually to expand the ranks of law schools from which they recruited,
large law firms continued to insist on top educational credentials and
extracurricular activities as required hiring criteria. Its commitment to
objective meritocracy made the new ideology hospitable to all candidates
who met its criteria of excellence.
However, its hypercompetitive
component undercut its meritocratic egalitarian aspects.
Objective
meritocracy has become a necessary yet insufficient condition for success,
overshadowed by the ideology's demands for total loyalty and devotion.
"Ideal" candidates were not only to meet merit credentials but also to be
willing to sacrifice personal lives, indeed to allow their professional identity
to overtake and consume their personal identity.131
130. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing,94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
131. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction
of Professional Identity, 14 CARDozO L. REv. 1577, 1578 (1993) (arguing that the legal
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Just as WASP "meritocracy" and competitive ideology coexisted and
fought for dominance for approximately twenty years between the mid1940s and the mid-1960s, so did competitive meritocracy and
hypercompetitive meritocracy battle for supremacy between the mid-1980s
and the mid-2000s. By the mid-2000s, in the years leading to the economic
downturn, however, hypercompetitive meritocracy became the dominant
ideology, with its more explicit emphases on the financial bottom line,
rainmaking, long hours, and around-the-clock client-centered representation
as key features. The hypercompetitive ideology was to a large extent
informed by and a product of the large law firm's quest to maintain its elite
status. Importantly, while it was not a conspiracy of men lawyers aimed at
the subjection of women lawyers, it was likely to have a devastating impact
on women lawyers when it interacted with prevailing gender stereotypes.

IV.

GENDER STEREOTYPES REVISITED: THE LARGE LAW FIRM CONTEXT

Stereotypes are exaggerated beliefs associated with a category, whose
32
function is to justify and rationalize conduct in relation to that category.'
At large law firms, stereotypes impact prehiring decisions such as whom to
meet with during on-campus interviews, whom to invite for callbacks, and
to whom to extend a summer associate position offer. Stereotypes later
influence retention decisions, such as whom to mentor, how much training
one receives, and promotion and postpromotion decisions, including who
makes partner, what kind of a partner (e.g., equity and nonequity), and how
much sway one has as a partner.
Gender stereotypes faced by women lawyers at large law firms might be
divided into three categories or types of stereotyping. First, women lawyers
face stereotypes as working women ("type 1" stereotype). As such, they
encounter beliefs that women belong in the home and not in the workplace,
should support and focus on their husbands' needs, should look pretty, and
should care for their children. These exaggerated beliefs have nothing in
particular to do with the practice of law, yet their impact is real and
disturbing. Exactly because these stereotypes are acquired outside the
33
practice of law, they are hard to combat and disprove within the practice. 1
profession promotes the concept of lawyering in which a lawyer's personal identity is
submerged in, even "bleach[ed] out" from, one's dominant professional identity);
Wasserstrom, supra note 99, at 12-15 (detailing the social costs associated with role
morality and role differentiation when professional identity comes to dominate personal
identity).
132. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 191 (1958) [hereinafter ALLPORT,
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE]; Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice,and Discrimination,in
2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.

1998) (defining stereotypes as a form of category-based reactions to "people from groups
perceived to differ significantly from one's own"); see also GORDON W. ALLPORT, ABC'S OF
SCAPEGOATING (1943) [hereinafter ALLPORT, ABC'S OF SCAPEGOATING]; VALIAN, supra note
9, at 198-208; Chamallas, supra note 24 (studying the scope and consequences of
stereotypes and other forms of gender bias in the workplace).
133. For detailed description of these stereotypes and their impact, see THE UNFINISHED
AGENDA, supra note 7, at 14-16; Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal

2274

FORDHAMLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

Next, women lawyers confront stereotypes as lawyers ("type 2"
stereotype). As such, women lawyers face the assumption that they are
incompetent, or at least not as competent as men lawyers, ill suited for the
adversarial temper presumably required by the adversary system,
and ill
34
positioned to understand the complexities of the business world.
Finally, women lawyers working at large law firms must cope with the
belief that they are not sufficiently committed to the firm and its clients and,
in particular, that their commitment to their family and children is
inconsistent and incompatible with their loyalty to their practice ("type 3"
stereotype). This specific stereotype is related to the generic stereotype that
women ought to stay at home and raise their children but takes a life of its
own in the context of the large law firm. Its emphasis is not on care for
children but rather disloyalty to the firm and its clients. Thus, solutions that
might address the generic stereotype, such as part-time arrangements and
work-from-home accommodations, fail to address the latter because the
issue is not merely the perception that women should stay at home and
assume primary responsibility for childcare. Even if modem technology
could easily enable women lawyers to multitask and work from home, the
assumption will still persist that those women lawyers are not paying
enough attention to their work and are distracted by their commitment to
their role as mothers.
Since women attorneys began to enter the legal profession in significant
numbers in the 1970s, gender stereotypes have inhibited their experience at
large law firms. The impact of these interrelated and powerful set of
stereotypes on the careers of women lawyers is both disturbing and
significant. The existing literature correctly identifies gender stereotypes as
an important factor explaining the glass ceiling effect and the
underrepresentation of women lawyers in prestigious segments of the legal
profession. 135 As a result of these exaggerated beliefs, male lawyers,
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733 (1995); Kathleen A.
Bergin, Sexualized Advocacy: The Ascendant Backlash Against Female Lawyers, 18 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 191 (2006); Chamallas, supra note 24; Carrie S. Coffman, Gingerbread
Women: StereotypicalFemale Attorneys in the Novels of John Grisham, 8 S. CAL. REV. L.

& WOMEN'S STUD. 73 (1998); Epstein et al. supra note 9; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia
Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75

(1994) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux]; Carolyn Lisa Miller, "What a Waste.
Beautiful, Sexy Gal. Hell of a Lawyer": Film and the Female Attorney, 4 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 203 (1994); Reichman & Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring, supra note 9;
Ballard, supra note 9; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of Women
Lawyers: The "Feminization" of the Legal Profession (UCLA Inst. Soc. Sci. Research,

Working Paper Vol. 3, No. 4, 1987), available at http://www.escholarship.org/
uc/item/9x36g2xv#. See generally BEYOND PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW, AND LITERATURE IN THE
UNITED STATES (Jacqueline St. Joan & Annette Bennington McElhiney eds., 1997)
(exploring stereotypical depictions of women lawyers in literature); HOLLY ENGLISH,
GENDER ON TRIAL:

SEXUAL STEREOTYPES AND WORK/LIFE BALANCE

IN THE LEGAL

WORKPLACE (2003) (studying the impact and consequences of gender stereotypes on women
lawyers).
134. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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historically the powerful decision makers within large firms, conclude that
women lawyers are a poor fit for the firm (type 1 stereotypes), have a low
likelihood of succeeding as a lawyer (type 2 stereotypes), and represent a
higher risk of leaving the firm several years down the road (type 3
stereotypes). Consequently, women lawyers are deemed not as worth the
investment in mentorship and training as their male counterparts. The
gender stereotype thus leads to negative consequences as female associates
tend to receive paperwork assignments as opposed to quality assignments.
Furthermore, due to type 3 stereotyping, firm partners assume that because
female associates prioritize their personal lives over their professional
commitment, they will likely work and bill fewer hours relative to male
associates and therefore will not be available during "crunch" time-late at
night, over the weekend, and during family holidays.
The impact of these gender stereotypes is very real. It may lead rational
decision makers within the firm to systematically prefer male associates to
female lawyers. And the stereotypes tend to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Because of the stereotype, male associates will likely receive better
assignments, superior mentorship, and advanced training. Over time, male
associates will have more and superior opportunities to become better
lawyers, rationalizing the biased decisions against women attorneys.
While not impossible to overcome, stereotypes tend to be relatively fixed
over time and resist change. 136 Women lawyers have benefited from the
gradual erosion of generic type 1 gender stereotypes with regard to
women's participation in the workforce. As documented by William J.
Goode, women began to participate in the workforce in significant numbers
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and their presence and roles were
gradually accepted as mainstream by the late nineteenth century. 137 When
they first entered the profession in large numbers in the 1970s, women
lawyers suffered from the type 1 stereotyping (for example, "a pretty
lawyer, what a waste" 138) but this stereotyping, relatively speaking, quickly
diminished. 139 Second-generation women lawyers have also benefited from
the gradual decline of type 2 stereotypes (for example, "women lawyers are
incompetent") in part because as the number of women lawyers continued
to grow, interaction and experience with women lawyers made it clear that
they were not incompetent.
Type 3 stereotypes, however, demonstrate the resistance of stereotyping
to change. These stereotypes have been particularly stubborn, in part
because the experiences of women lawyers at large law firms tend to verify,
rather than disprove, the stereotypes in the eyes of those who believe in
them. Every female associate who departs a firm to care for a child
136. See ALLPORT, ABC'S OF SCAPEGOATING, supra note 132; ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE, supra note 132, at 191.
137. WILLIAM J. GOODE, WORLD REVOLUTION AND FAMILY PATTERNS (1963); THE
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN FAMILY (William J. Goode ed., 1971).
138. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 133.
139. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 7, at 14-16.
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"proves" the stereotype. And every associate who does not depart "proves"
that total commitment to the firm requires
not having a child or clearly
"prioritizing" the firm above childcare. 14 0
While stereotypes tend to persist, they may be positive or negative, or,
more accurately, stereotypes may have positive or negative
consequences. 14 1 Moreover, stereotypes have a dynamic influence, as they
tend to interact and respond to changing practice realities, culture, and
ideologies.1 42 Changing professional ideologies, for example, may change
the consequences of persisting stereotypes. Stereotypes that used to have
negative consequences can have positive consequences under a new
ideology, and vice versa. While stereotypes with positive consequences
might yield even better outcomes under a more favorable ideology, an
unfavorable ideology may worsen the impact of some stereotypes, as is the
case for type 3 stereotypes faced by women lawyers at large law firms.
V. WHEN STEREOTYPES MEET PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGY

The impact and consequences of stereotypes are a function of the
interaction of stereotypes with the particular workplace, its culture,
expectations, and prevailing ideology. Large law firms have always been a
fertile ground for the use of stereotypes. Assessing the performance of a
large number of associates is time consuming and difficult, both given the
inherently subjective nature of the assessment and the fact that the work
often resulted not in individualized, discrete work product but in a
contribution to a team-generated product. As Mitu Gulati and David B.
Wilkins point out, large law firm partners have always had the incentive to
mentor those associates they thought they knew best, associates with
socioeconomic, ethnoreligious, and cultural characteristics similar to their
own. 143
Increasingly competitive practices over the last two decades, however,
have made relying on stereotyping even more appealing. As large law
firms grew exponentially, the large number of incoming associates, the low
likelihood that any one of them will stay with the firm in the long run, and
the competitive pressures to maximize effective use of partners' time for
billing purposes all increased the appeal of .using stereotypes in lieu of
140. This is what Rhode has called the "double

bind." See Rhode, Gender and

Professional Roles, supra note 7, at 67-69; Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, supra note 7, at
590-91; Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem, supra note 7, at 1753-55.
141. See ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, supra note 132.

142. While positive stereotyping might entail beneficial consequences, as was the case for
Jewish attorneys and law finns, whether stereotyping is ever desirable is very much in
dispute. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259 (2000); Paul Horwitz, Uncovering Identity, 105 MICH. L. REV.' 1283 (2007) (reviewing
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING:

THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006)); Chris

Frates, Owens' "Stereotyping" Not Positively Received, DENVER POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at IB
(discussing the controversy surrounding Colorado Governor Bill Owens's comments
regarding positive Jewish and Asian cultural stereotypes).
143. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 57, at 1608-13.
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investing time in getting to know new associates, let alone training them. 144
In addition, as the graduating classes of elite law schools featured
increasingly diverse student bodies, the perception among large law firm
partners has become that getting to know these new lawyers would have
taken significantly more time and commitment than in the past.
Professional ideology both legitimizes and magnifies the impact and
consequences of stereotypes, and while professional ideology per se does
not determine whether the consequences of a particular stereotype will be
positive or negative, it does legitimize its usage and amplify its impact,
whatever those may be. To be sure, professional ideology is not advanced
for the purpose of legitimizing the use of stereotypes. Since its foundation,
the large law firm has effectively used its claim to be a meritocracy to first
secure and subsequently maintain its elite professional status atop the legal
profession. 145 Its credible claim to meritocracy has allowed it to establish
its status and leverage it into political power, professional standing, and, of
course, financial rewards.
Yet a distinctive side effect of professional ideology is its use as a
cover-an excuse to explain the use of stereotypes by concealing true
reasons for their invocation:
cost-cutting, ignorance, and even
discrimination. In the name of its WASP, "meritocratic" ideology, elite
Wall Street law firms discriminated against Jewish and Catholic lawyers in
part by relying on stereotypes to explain why these lawyers lacked the
cultural and background sensibilities (read WASP) to succeed as attorneys.
Competitive meritocracy opened the door to ethnoreligious minorities and
women lawyers and even, over time, ushered equality to Jewish and
Catholic men lawyers, but still relied on stereotypes to exclude racial
minorities and deny equality for women lawyers. Hypercompetitive
ideology now helps justify the continued inequitable treatment of women
lawyers.
A. The "Flip Side of Bias ": The Shift from WASP "Meritocracy" to
Competitive Meritocracy and Its Impact on Jewish Lawyers
The impact of the interplay between professional ideology and
stereotypes on the career prospects of large law firm lawyers and, in
particular, the varying consequences of stereotypes under different and
changing ideologies can be significant. The experience of male Jewish
lawyers, first under WASP "meritocracy" and subsequently under
competitive meritocracy, illustrates this point. Operating alongside explicit
discrimination, the interchange between WASP ideology and stereotyping
144. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law
School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705, 740-41

(1998) (noting that partners' exclusive focus on making a profit results in little time and little
incentive to mentor associates); S. Elizabeth Wilborn & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Views
from the Front: A DialogAbout the CorporateLaw Firm, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 1293, 1299-300
(same).
145. Wald, supra note 5, at 1810-28.
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limited the progress of Jewish and Catholic lawyers. 146 Ethnoreligious
stereotypes, such as that Jews are "pushy" and "aggressive," "money
grabbing," and "stingy,"' 147 were inconsistent with the values of WASP
"meritocracy" and thus allowed the law firms to explain and mask their
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in terms of their professional
ideology. 148 After all, these stereotypes were per se inconsistent with
WASP ideology and white-shoe values.
Other ethnoreligious stereotypes, such as that "Jews are smart," that in
theory could have had a positive impact on the hiring prospects of Jewish
law students could not compensate for the negative consequences of the
other stereotypes. Discriminatory admissions policies excluded Jews from
elite law schools and deprived them of the platform on which to showcase
their presumed intellectual strengths. Moreover, the "smart" stereotype was
countered by the stereotype that Jews had an "oriental mind" and lacked the
necessary (elite WASP) sensibilities to succeed at the practice of large law
firms.
Consequently, even after elite law schools relaxed admissions quotas and
Jewish law students began to meet the elite meritocratic standards set by the
large law firms, 14 9 WASP ideology restricted the progress of Jewish
lawyers. 150 Successful Jewish lawyers were able to meet the objective
criteria set by the large firms but were unable to meet the spirit and values
in which those objective standards were shaped-WASP ideology. While
there is no doubt that ethnoreligious discrimination has played a role in
limiting the professional progress of male Jewish lawyers after 1945,
146. Id. at 1813-21.
147. See id. at 1844-47; see also Wald, supra note 119, at 929-33.
148. Wald, supra note 5, at 1813-23.
149. Prior to 1945, quotas were common practice. See 1 U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM'N, THE
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS INSCHOOLS, S. Doc. No. 61-749, at 154-56, 160 (3d Sess. 1911)
(documenting the number of Jewish students enrolled in law schools); 5 id. at 776-89
(same); Bureau of Jewish Soc. Research, Professional Tendencies Among Jewish Students in
Colleges, Universities, and ProfessionalSchools, in 22 THE AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK
383, 383-93 (Harry Schneiderman ed., 1920) (surveying professional tendencies among
Jewish students in higher education); see also HEYWOOD BROut & GEORGE BRITr,
CHRISTIANS ONLY: A STUDY IN PREJUDICE 161-74 (1931) (providing anecdotal evidence of

prejudice in hiring in the legal profession). After 1945, law schools began to drop
discriminatory quotas. See ABEL, supra note 102, at 85-87, 109 (exploring admission quotas
as barriers to entering the profession); HAROLD S. WECHSLER, THE QUALIFIED STUDENT: A
HISTORY OF SELECTIVE COLLEGE ADMISSION IN AMERICA 168-73 (1977) (discussing

selective admission at Columbia's professional schools); Jerold S. Auerbach, From Rags to
Robes: The Legal Profession, Social Mobility and the American Jewish Experience, 66 AM.
JEWISH HIST. Q. 249, 278-81 (1977) (discussing how prevailing admissions criteria had
benefited Jewish law students and reversed professional discrimination); Marcia Graham
Synnott, Anti-Semitism and American Universities: Did Quotas Follow the Jews?, in ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233, 258-59 (David A. Gerber ed., 1986) (summarizing
rising Jewish enrollment in top law schools and the subsequent decrease in Jewish
enrollment in elite law schools by 1946 due to adverse reactions by the elite bar); see also
Malcolm Gladwell, Getting In: The Social Logic of Ivy League Admissions, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 10, 2005, at 80 (reviewing admissions policies at undergraduate Ivy League
institutions).
150. Wald, supra note 5, at 1813-23.
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WASP "meritocratic" ideology allowed the large firms to justify their
discriminatory hiring (and later promotion) policies in nondiscriminatory,
ideological terms. It is thus not a coincidence that the first Jewish lawyers
to advance in the elite large firms were Jews of German descent of higher
socioeconomic background: 15 1 if discrimination alone was holding Jewish
lawyers back, presumably all Jewish lawyers would have experienced it
equally. Yet Jewish lawyers who met the objective merit-based criteria of
the large firms and were able to overcome, or even merely effectively
cover, 15 2 stereotypical assumptions were admitted.
Strikingly, the very same stereotypes that inhibited Jewish lawyers'
progress under WASP "meritocracy" became an asset under competitive
meritocracy. 153 "Aggressiveness" became a desirable quality in lawyers as
the ideology became more explicitly client centered. "Pushy" was a useful
trait in a professional world that now acknowledged the need to compete for
clients and for talented lawyers. "Money grabbing" and "stinginess"
became desirable skills when law practice began to put more explicit
emphasis on efficiency and the financial bottom line. In other words, under
the new competitive ideology, Jewish lawyers experienced the effects of the
"flip side of bias": 154 the same old stereotypes that had negative
consequences under the WASP "meritocratic" ideology now had positive
consequences under the competitive meritocratic ideology. Further, the
new ideology highlighted the "Jews are smart" stereotype and allowed it to
have a strong positive impact on the career prospects of Jewish lawyers.
Competitive meritocracy acknowledged the realities of increased
competition for talented lawyers and turned "smart" Jewish lawyers into a
desirable human capital commodity.
B. From Glass Ceilings to Dead Ends: The Shift from Competitive
Meritocracy to Hypercompetitive Meritocracyand Its Impact on
Women Lawyers
Women lawyers first began to enter the legal profession, and in particular
large law firms, in significant numbers in the early 1970s. The barriers to
entry faced by first-generation women lawyers at large law firms were
significant.
Women lawyers faced daunting explicit and implicit
discrimination coupled with type 1, type 2, and type 3 stereotyping: women
lawyers did not belong in the practice of law, were incompetent, and lacked
the sufficient professional drive to succeed as lawyers because of their
inherently competing loyalties as wives and mothers.
First-generation women lawyers, however, entered large law firm
practice during the ascendancy of the competitive meritocratic ideology,
which played a positive role in opening the doors of large law firms to

151. Id. at 1838 n.158.
152. Id.; see also Randall Kennedy, Racial Passing,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145 (2001).

153. Wald, supra note 5, at 1844-47, 1860; Wald, supra note 119, at 929-33.
154. Wald, supra note 5, at 1844-47, 1860; Wald, supra note 119, at 929-33.
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women lawyers and helped combat some of the negative consequences of
the prevailing stereotypes, especially in contrast to the old WASP
"meritocracy." Women lawyers were nearly unimaginable under WASP
"meritocracy," and the few who ventured to enter faced significant type 1,
type 2, and type 3 stereotyping. Women were supposed to stay home, look
pretty, and support their lawyer-husbands' careers by hosting cocktail
parties and doing charity work, not by invading the workplace. Women
lawyers were incompetent and lacked the sophisticated business
understanding required at the meritocratic law offices handling the affairs of
large corporate clients. Finally, the kind of loyalty demanded by the large
firm was understood to be strongly inconsistent with the role and
commitment of women as women. Tales of associates' endless hours in the
office are as old as the large firms themselves. Large, elite law firms have
155
earned their reputation as sweatshops under the WASP "meritocracy,"
1 56
which demanded loyalty to the firm as a secular calling.
Moreover, while loyalty and intense commitment were essential, even a
condition for success, they did not constitute the entire WASP ideology.
Loyalty was necessary, but it was not sufficient. Indeed, many associates
spent years logging endless hours without being promoted, a commitment
and a practice reality hardly imaginable today. 157 Notably, WASP
"meritocracy" demanded more than loyalty. Its meritocratic aspect required
demonstrated excellence, and its WASP component necessitated Protestant
values, white-shoe culture, and socioeconomic indicia of elite status.
Correspondingly, the WASP "meritocratic" ideology offered a lot more
than mere financial rewards in return. It promised elite professional status,
social and cultural standing, political power, intellectual challenge, and
networking with society's power brokers. Women, and women lawyers in
particular, were thought to be, relying on gender stereotypes, irrelevant and
inconsistent given this ideology, which mixed professional values, business
interests, ethnoreligious identity, and conservative socioeconomic and
cultural sensitivities.
Against this background, opening the doors of large law firms was made
somewhat easier by the rise of competitive ideology. Under the influence
of competitive meritocracy, large law firms were, to a growing extent, both
claiming to hire (and subsequently promote) the best and actually doing so,
irrespective of ethnoreligious background and even gender. Women
lawyers who met the merit criteria set by the large law firms were more
likely to be hired under competitive meritocracy than they were under
WASP "meritocracy." When elite law schools dropped their discriminatory

155. See, e.g., WALTER K. EARLE & CHARLES C. PARLIN, SHEARMAN AND STERLING:
1873-1973, at 28 (2d ed. 1973); NANCY LISAGOR & FRANK Lipsius, A LAW UNTO ITSELF:
THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LAW FIRM OF SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 22 (1988).

156. Wald, supra note 5, at 1810-25.
157. However, the economic downturn may change associates' expectations and render
them more tolerant of extended partnership tracks. See supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
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admissions policies, women law students rose to the top of their classes and
met the merit standards required by the large firms. Importantly, while
WASP "meritocracy" restricted entry to women lawyers, competitive
meritocracy eased it. As large law firms began to experience increased
competition in the 1970s and 1980s, and as their new competitive ideology
put a growing emphasis on competition to get the best associates and
lessened the pressure to honor old WASP traditions, women lawyers gained
58
entry to the large firms. 1
Women lawyers could have expected and in fact did fare better under
competitive meritocracy. 159 However, unlike its impact on male Jewish
lawyers, competitive meritocracy did not create a "flip-side-of-bias" effect
for women lawyers because the negative stereotypes impeding women
lawyers' progress at large law firms-women belong at home, are
incompetent, and are undercommitted-still imposed a disadvantage. In
contrast, competitive meritocracy benefited male Jewish lawyers because
the familiar stereotypes of "aggression," "money grabbing," and cultural
"crustiness" were now perceived as not only consistent with, but even
advantageous pursuant to, the new competitive ideology. For women
lawyers, the new emphasis on competition opened the door, but only so far.
The new competitive spirit meant that it was harder to consistently and
systematically overlook the most qualified women lawyers, but the familiar
stereotypes still held women back.
For example, to the extent that "Jewish aggressiveness" was perceived as
an
advantage
under competitive
ideology,
women's
"soft,"
"accommodating," and "aggression-avoiding" assumed qualities, all
associated with the type 1 stereotype, were still a disadvantage. Similarly,
women lawyers still had to overcome the hurdle of type 2 gender
stereotypes relating to presumptions of incompetence and ignorance
regarding "business" and "financial matters." Furthermore, competitive
ideology flipped the bias against male Jewish lawyers because it allowed
some dormant stereotypes, such as "Jews are smart," to flourish. There was
no equivalent benefit to women lawyers under the new ideology.
Competitive meritocracy finally acknowledged women lawyers as talented
professionals and helped fight type 1 stereotypes, but its growing emphasis
on competitiveness still tolerated, even accommodated, type 2 and type 3
stereotyping.
Furthermore, while the competitive and meritocratic aspects of the
ideology helped open doors for women lawyers by combating the impact of
type 1 gender stereotypes, they did little to assist women of color overcome
158. Yet one should not belittle the hardships encountered by first-generation women
lawyers in the 1970s and 1980s, which included explicit and implicit discrimination,
stereotyping, and segregation-admitting women lawyers only to relegate them to "women"
practice areas. See supra Part IV.
159. This is not to deny the residual power of old ideologies. No doubt, WASP women
lawyers and Caucasian women lawyers in general could have expected to do better than
ethnoreligious and racial minority women lawyers in terms of hiring and promotion.
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harmful racial stereotypes.
Indeed, the increased emphasis on
competitiveness, combined with the realities of higher billable hours and
increased specialization and growing complexity of large law firm practice,
may have amplified the negative consequences of racial stereotypes faced
by black women lawyers, such as beliefs
that they are "incompetent" 160 and
"not intelligent enough" to succeed. 16 1
Imperfect as it certainly was, competitive meritocracy did help change
the world of large law firms and open their doors to women lawyers. Had
competitive meritocracy continued to prevail, perhaps it would have helped
erode, over time, type 2 and 3 stereotypes. Arguably, the stereotypical
myth of being incompetent and incapable of understanding complex
business affairs was bound to be disproven over time as more women
lawyers entered the profession and demonstrated their competence. The
stereotype of being insufficiently committed to the firm and its clients
would still be a hurdle, yet competitive meritocracy could have allowed
women lawyers to prove their loyalty and commitment and eventually
162
disprove the stereotype.
The opportunity inherent in competitive meritocracy, arguably explaining
the cautiously optimistic tone of the glass ceiling literature, has been
severely limited given the rise of hypercompetitive ideology. While
meritocracy is still an inherent feature of the ideology women lawyers can
easily meet, the hypercompetitive aspect of the ideology celebrates overthe-top commitment and loyalty to clients and the firm above all else, even
160. See Derrick Bell, Thurgood Marshall, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 213-14 (1993)
(describing the struggle of black lawyers to overcome the stereotype of incompetence);
David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate
Law Firms? An InstitutionalAnalysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 572 n.284 (1996) (explaining

how Caucasian associate mistakes are thought to be the result of miscommunications and
misunderstandings, whereas minority associate mistakes are presumed to demonstrate
incompetence).
161. See Report of the Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task
Force on Gender,Race andEthnic Bias, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189, 193 (1996) (reporting a

comment by an African American male attorney that some judges assume that "lawyers of
color aren't as good, smart, or prepared as white lawyers"). See generally David B. Wilkins,
A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV.

1915, 1934 (2005) (exploring the experiences of black law students and practicing attorneys
"in a world that continues to be dominated with negative images and stereotypes about
blacks"); Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science To
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness " Defense, 7 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 401, 435 (2003) (noting that "very few studies have examined stereotypes

related to women of color and motherhood"). A step in the right direction of examining the
interplay of gender and racial stereotypes are recent ABA Commission on Women in the
Profession reports. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, FROM VISIBLE
INVISIBILITY TO VISIBLY SUCCESSFUL: SUCCESS STRATEGIES FOR LAW FIRMS AND WOMEN OF
COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2008); ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN N THE PROFESSION, VISIBLE
INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR N LAW FIRMS (2006).

162. See Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem, supra note 7 (pointing out insightfully that

gender stereotypes regarding disloyalty and lack of commitment to the firm are disproven by
the very women lawyers who stay at large firms and attempt to strike a work-life balance,
because such a Herculean effort would only be undertaken by those truly committed to the
firm).
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above meritocracy. The new ideology highlights and amplifies with new
vigor type 3 stereotypes regarding women's lack of commitment and
disloyalty to clients and the firm, and the negative consequences are
devastating.
To be clear, scholars of the legal profession have long noted that legal
careers are largely shaped by and designed for men with families who were
"family-free," with models that expect utmost commitment to the
workplace and a willingness to sacrifice family life. 16 3 Hypercompetitive
meritocracy is different from old, familiar models not in orientation but in
scope and tone. It defines excellence in terms of total commitment, aroundthe-clock client service, and instant responsiveness. Thus, it forecloses, by
its very nature, the possibility of reduced or flexible schedules and reliance
on technology to allow for work-from-home alternatives. 164 Objectively,
laptops, wireless technology, blackberries, PDF attachments, video
conferencing, etc., should have allowed lawyers to work from home, but the
hypercompetitive ideology prevents that. What the ideology requires is not
only physical attendance in the office, which objectively is somewhat
obsolete given technological advancements, but physical attendance as a
symbolic measure of loyalty, 24/7 commitment, and near-instant
responsiveness. This means that even if one could work from home, one
would actually work 24/7, thus frustrating the reasons for staying at
home. 165
The hypercompetitive ideology accentuates and aggravates the negative
consequences of the type 3 stereotype. The more emphasis put by the
hypercompetitive ideology on around-the-clock commitment to the firm
and clients, the more the disloyal and undercommitted stereotypes harm
women lawyers at large law firms. In particular, while type 1 stereotypes
163. See, e.g., ENGLISH, supra note 133, at 230; Ballard, supra note 9, at 22-26; Williams,
supra note 161, at 412-48 (exploring the interplay between workplace design, ideology, and
gender stereotypes).
164. But see CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT ET AL., THE PROJECT FOR ATTORNEY RETENTION,
REDUCED HOURS, FULL SUCCESS: PART-TIME PARTNERS IN U.S. LAW FIRMS 1 (2009),
available at http://www.pardc.org/Publications/Part-TimePartner.pdf (reporting an increase
in the number of part-time partners, from 1.6% in 1999 to 3% in 2008, and a decline in the
negative stigma associated with part-time status). While a welcome development, it should
be noted that the overall number of part-time partners is still very low and that the authors
note a possible bias in their finding-it is based on interviews with part-time partners who
have stayed with their firms and who "therefore are most likely to be happy with their
arrangements" and not feel or experience a negative stigma. Id. at 1, 19. For a
counterperspective suggesting that the large law firms' records are not improving fast
enough, see Kim Tasso, Opinion, Law Firms' Flexible Working Policies-CouldDo Better,
LAWYER, Feb. 15, 2010, at 6, http://www.thelawyer.com/opinion-law-firmsE2%80%99flexible-working-policies-%E2%80%93-could-do-better/1003459.article.
See generally
CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN ET AL., THE PART-TIME PARADOX:
LIFE, FAMILY, AND GENDER (1999).

TIME NORMS, PROFESSIONAL

165. See Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrierto
Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (2003) (exploring gender discrimination based
on maternal stereotyping); Joan C. Williams, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal
Wall: Using Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence To Prove Gender Discrimination,7
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 287,287-93 (2003) (same).
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may be mostly a thing of the past and type 2 stereotypes are being
disproven by the competent work of many women lawyers, type 3
stereotypes clash with the hypercompetitive meritocracy head-on.
This new powerful clash between the demands of the hypercompetitive
ideology and type 3 gender stereotypes helps explain why, even as type 1
and type 2 stereotypes are in decline, women lawyers at large law firms are
still facing innumerable hurdles on the road to equality, and arguably are
facing a more difficult challenge than they did under competitive
meritocracy because the particular stereotypes that inhibit their progresslack of commitment and sufficient loyalty to the firm and its clients and
prioritizing family over work-have harsh consequences given the new
prevailing ideology of hypercompetitiveness.
Unlike the case of WASP "meritocracy" in which loyalty played an
important but not an all-consuming role, under hypercompetitive ideology
total devotion to the firm and its clients has become the core of the ideology
and its sole measure of excellence. Elite professional credentials are but a
necessary condition to entry, and 24/7 loyalty is the measure of
commitment and success. The dilution of the professional ideology and its
reduction to firm and client-centered loyalty has been mirrored by the
dilution of the rewards offered by the hypercompetitive ideology-mere
financial rewards. 166 And the reward aspect of the ideology reinforces its
demand of total loyalty: one is only deserving of sharing in the riches if
one is willing to sacrifice his or her personal life.
In a misleading sense, hypercompetitive ideology is gender blind. To the
extent that women lawyers are willing to sacrifice their personal life and
demonstrate total devotion and loyalty to the firm and its clients, the path to
equity partnership appears to be open to them. Yet this is exactly where
type 3 stereotypes kick in to block the career advancement of women
lawyers. Pursuant to the stereotypes, women lawyers are assumed to lack
the necessary commitment and devotion to the firm because of their
assumed desire to get married, start a family, become mothers, and care for
their children. 16 7 All women lawyers of all racial, ethnoreligious,
socioeconomic, and cultural backgrounds are assumed similarly to lack
what it takes to succeed as lawyers at large firms, and the desire to become
a mother is imputed to them. 168 Indeed, in today's cultural and legal
environment, which appropriately recognizes the rights of same-sex
families to have and adopt children, even gay women are labeled the same
way.
166. See Wilkins, supra note 91; see also John P. Heinz, When Law Firms Fail, 43

SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 67 (2009); Wald, supra note 5, at 1861-62.
167. See Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal Wall:
Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of "Carers" in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 31, 31 (2006) (arguing that gender stereotyping of women as mothers

and caregivers constitutes a discriminatory wall).
168. Joan Williams notes that women of color, in addition to stereotyping regarding
motherhood and caregiving, may be confronted with assumptions of single motherhood. See
Williams, supra note 161, at 435-36.
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Pursuant to the hypercompetitive ideology, motherhood and the practice
as an elite lawyer at a large law firm are inherently and irreversibly
incompatible. Presumably, a wife and a mother could simply not work
24/7, technological advancements notwithstanding. 169 The only women
lawyers who might escape the consequences of the stereotype are childless
women lawyers, but they are assumed to want to have children and
ironically lack the capacity to prove otherwise, even if they are committed
to significantly delay or even altogether forgo having children in order to
attain professional success.
Moreover, arguably the "generation me"
phenomenon further compounds the powerful interplay of type 3
stereotypes and hypercompetitive ideology. 170 Women lawyers in the
twenty-first century are presumed to lack the resolve and willingness to
sacrifice that characterized the first-generation women lawyers of the 1970s. 171
Glass ceiling scholars have voiced cautious optimism regarding gender
equality, 172 hoping that part-time arrangements 173 and parental leave
policies will more commonly be implemented by large law firms. 174 Rhode
has correctly pointed out that "[r]estructuring both work and domestic roles
is essential to achieving equal opportunity in fact as well as theory," that
"[m]uch may depend on the size and profit margins of the institution and
the predictability of work in part-time employees' areas of specialization,"
and finally, that "[g]ender hierarchies will persist until concerns about the
175
quality of life become more central professional priorities."
Unfortunately, the conditions for gender equality identified by Rhode are
less likely to hold under the hypercompetitive ideology. Large law firms
are highly hierarchal, conservative, and, in the aftermath of the economic

169. Joan Williams aptly calls this phenomenon a "maternal wall." See, e.g., Williams &
Westfall, supra note 167, at 31.
170. See, e.g., JEAN M. TWENGE, GENERATION ME: WHY TODAY'S YOUNG AMERICANS
ARE MORE CONFIDENT, ASSERTIVE, ENTITLED-AND MORE MISERABLE THAN EVER BEFORE

(2006).
171. Id. Interestingly, while there is no empirical support for this stereotypical
assumption, it is shared by some first generation lawyers with regard to younger women
lawyers. See Reichman & Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in
Legal Careers,supra note 9,at 52, 70.
172. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 133, at 113 ("[A]ttention to
gender and quality of life issues with which women are more likely to be concerned, may
cause the profession as a whole to reevaluate the demand of its 'greedy institutions' that
seem to require so much devotion to work."). "As female attorneys constitute an increasing
part of the profession, it becomes increasingly costly to discount their needs and devalue
their talents." Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, supra note 7, at 63. "[I]n many
practice settings, the entrance of a critical mass has brought significant improvements." Id. at

68. Still, "[p]eer pressures, socialization patterns, and personal convenience all war against
egalitarian roles [for women lawyers]." Id. at 62; see also Dona S. Kahn, Breaking Through:
A Woman's Journey Through the Male Dominated Law Profession of the Mid-Twentieth
Century, 30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 628 (2009).
173. See CALVERT ET AL., supra note 164; Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, supra
note 7, at 62.

174. Rhode, Gender and ProfessionalRoles, supra note 7, at 64.
175. Id.; see also Foster, supra note 9, at 1673 (surveying the ineffectiveness of judicial
scrutiny and arguing, "Law Firms Must Alter Their Paradigms From Within").
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downturn, experiencing shrinking and increasingly unpredictable profit
margins, all rendering it less likely that they will restructure to
accommodate work-life arrangements.
Further, pursuant to the
hypercompetitive professional ideology, not only are concerns about the
quality of life less central, but they are in fact in stark conflict with total
devotion and utmost loyalty to the firm and its clients. Part-time
arrangements and parental leaves are less likely under the hypercompetitive
ideology because, irrespective of increased technological feasibility and
formal institutional acceptance, they contradict the values of the ideology
by their very nature. Taking advantage of such arrangements is thus
176
discouraged and renders those who might do so not only less committed,
but also worse, as those who either "do not get what it takes to succeed" or
"get it but are unwilling or unable to do what it takes." Therefore, while it
is true that "in many practice settings, the entrance of a critical mass [of
women lawyers] has brought significant improvements,"' 177 and that in
many settings and arenas women lawyers are changing, even redefining, the
practice of law,178 large law firms appear to be a practice setting in which
gender equality is likely to be less attainable in the foreseeable future given
179
their dominant inhospitable professional ideology.
VI. ON THE ROAD AGAIN: THE PROSPECTS FOR THE DEMISE OF THE
HYPERCOMPETITIVE IDEOLOGY AND IMPROVED GENDER EQUALITY

Gender inequality, in the legal profession in general, and at large law
firms' partnership ranks in particular, has long been documented. While the
range of possible responses may "follow fairly obviously from the
diagnoses,"' 180 and includes professional regulations and enforcement
strategies, 18 1 as well as workplace modifications, 182 large law firms have
176. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW, supra note 9, at 392-414.

177. Rhode, Gender andProfessionalRoles, supra note 7, at 68.
178. For explorations of the ways in which women lawyers redefine the practice of law,
see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:

Speculations on a Women's

Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (advancing the notion of women
lawyers' "ethic of care" as an alternative to the male-oriented "standard account" of legal
ethics). See also VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1998); SUZANNE NOSSEL & ELIZABETH WESTFALL, PRESUMED EQUAL:
WHAT AMERICA'S TOP WOMEN LAWYERS REALLY THINK ABOUT THEIR FIRMS (1998); ROBIN
SAX, REACHING THE BAR: STORIES FROM WOMEN AT ALL STAGES OF THEIR LAW CAREERS
(2009); Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 133, at 113 (revisiting and refining the
"ethic of care").
179. This is not to belittle recent positive developments and efforts by law firms to pursue

gender equality. See CALVERT ET AL., supra note 164 (reporting the growing acceptability of
partner part-time arrangements); Kaye & Reddy, supra note 9, at 1966-73 (examining
positive developments toward gender equality at large law firms). Rather, the point is that
the hypercompetitive ideology, especially when interacting with prevailing gender
stereotypes, is inconsistent with, and is likely to make more difficult, the changes necessary
to make gender equality more attainable.
180. Rhode, Gender and ProfessionalRoles, supra note 7, at 69.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 70.
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remained, for the most part, conservatively unresponsive. Professional
regulation, a poor and underenforced measure generally, 183 is particularly
ill suited to deal with law firms, let alone powerful, large, elite law firms.
In fact, the organized bar appears to have essentially given up on even
trying to meaningfully regulate large, elite law firms.1 84 Internally, large
law firms are hierarchal, have a hiring and promotion structure that make it
especially difficult to address the dynamics and legacy of both past and
ongoing gender inequality, 185 and, as this article argues, are guided by a
professional ideology that is, by its very nature, inhospitable to gender
equality.
The rise of hypercompetitive ideology at large law firms is therefore bad
news for women lawyers and for the prospect of greater gender equality in
the legal profession.
In contrast with competitive meritocracy,
hypercompetitive meritocracy, while still requiring merit as a condition of
hiring and promotion, puts greater emphasis on around-the-clock
commitment and demonstrated loyalty to the law firm and its clients,
demands that clash with type 3 gender stereotypes. That is not to say, of
course, that individual women lawyers cannot make partner at large law
firms under the new ideology. Yet the new ideology is likely to further
hinder the progress of women lawyers as a group toward equality at large
law firms and make the journey a more difficult one than it used to be.
Because hypercompetitiveness limits the advancement of women lawyers
at large law firms, it ought to come under attack. 186 Lawyers as high priests
of a civic religion and as guardians of the Rule of Law 187 ought to lead the
way in the fight for equality, 188 and professional ideologies inconsistent
with such a mission ought to be denounced. Fortunately, the prospects for
an ideological shift are good.
Large law firms risk losing their credible claim to elite status if they do
not revise their hypercompetitive culture. Large firms used to be able to
claim elite standing and use it to recruit the best and the brightest, which in
turn reinforced their claim to elite status because they had a compelling
ideology and an attractive package to offer that included elite status,
183. See ABEL, supra note 102.
184. In recent years, federal agencies have demonstrated a willingness to take on large
law firms and attempted to enforce regulations. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Kaye
Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion and

Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998). See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing
Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994).
185. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, From "SeparateIs Inherently Unequal" to "DiversityIs
Good for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the

Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1548 (2004) (exploring various arguments for
diversity and equality); Rhode & Packel, supra note 42, at 4-9 (same).
187. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 53 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
188. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (2000).
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intellectually challenging work, political power, and handsome financial
rewards. If all large law firms have left is the promise of a lot of money,
alongside demands of total loyalty and the sacrifice of personal lives as the
measure of excellence, it may not be enough to attract the best candidates
and sustain their elite status. 189
Ironically then, the inequitable
hypercompetitive ideology is likely to decline not because of its impact on
women lawyers but because it threatens to undermine the elite status of
large firms. 190 Moreover, a growing number of men and women are
interested in a more effective work/life balance, with a greater emphasis on
life accommodations, 191 further destabilizing the hypercompetitive ideology
with its complete commitment to work at the expense of personal life.
The possible decline of hypercompetitive meritocracy as a dominant
ideology constitutes only qualified good news. As the shifts from WASP
"meritocracy" to competitive meritocracy and from competitive
meritocracy to hypercompetitive meritocracy illustrate, ideological
transformation may take place over several decades. For the time being, as
unstable as it may be, hypercompetitiveness is here to stay, inhibiting the
career prospects of women lawyers practicing at large law firms.
What an alternative large law firm professional ideology might look like
is at this stage unclear. 192 One thing, however, is certain. In order to
advance gender equality, the new ideology should be inconsistent with
prevailing gender stereotypes. While such an ideology may not be able to
cause a "flip side of bias" effect and turn old stereotypes on their head, by
embracing, for example, commitment to a meaningful personal life as a
desired professional quality, it ought to at least make it difficult to
incorporate negative gender stereotypes and rely on them to justify
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices couched in terms of
professional ideology.
189. This phenomenon is somewhat reminiscent of the challenge faced by large law firms
in the 1960s, as cohorts of young and excited law graduates rejected the appeal of large law
firms and threatened, for a while, the elite status of large law firms. Over time, large law
firms were able to deflect the threat by committing themselves to the provision of pro bono
services and raising salaries, tactics unlikely to succeed today.
190. This result is ironic but not unprecedented. In fact, past ideological shifts were
similarly motivated not by egalitarian considerations but by the entrepreneurial quest for
elite professional power, political influence, and rich financial rewards. WASP meritocracy
displaced gentlemanly premeritocracy and competitive meritocracy replaced WASP
meritocracy because of the professional, political, and monetary drive of powerful partners,
and only subsequently was described to be motivated by professional and egalitarian
reasons. See Wald, supra note 5.
191. A condition Rhode and others identified as necessary for a meaningful change. See
RHODE, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA, supra note 7; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Wal-Mart
To Require Outside Law Firms To Have Flextime Policies, Oct. 27, 2009, A.B.A. J.,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/wal-mart-to_require-outside law-firms_to_have_
flextime_policies/.
192. In this Symposium David Wilkins offers one such vision, pursuant to which large
law firm lawyers might become, and come to think of themselves, not as agents serving
principal-clients but rather as junior partners, working alongside their clients. See Wilkins,
supra note 94.

